Yeah that's a good idea. So far, the main way we have been addressing this issue is by making CacheWord as easy to use as possible. Its a complementary library for managing AES256 keys like what SQLCipher uses. But that of course still relies on the user entering a password.
As for techniques for better managing a password without having the user enter one, that I haven't looked deep into because I believe it is ultimately futile. If the user does not need to enter the password to unlock something, neither will anyone else. One minor improvement would be using a hardware security module (HSM) to manage the password in this kind of setup. As far as I understand how they are implemented in smartphones, a forensic data acquisition would not be able to get the keys out of the HSM. So then the actual device would be required in order to unlock the encryption. .hc Chris Kuethe: > Would it be worth creating a security advice page? Something that clearly > calls out certain risky behaviors, possibly with links to 3rd party > write-ups like this one? Clearly not everyone who uses sqlcipher is a > sophisticated developer. They know enough to not roll their own crypto, but > why not give them some guidance on how to use it correctly? > > "Don't hard code a key into your app." > "Don't just use the IMEI of the device in your app." > "Allow the user to lock the app/database with a password, and give them the > option to flush it from memory when not in use." > "Don't directly accept the user's password. Run it through a well-known > KDF." > "Don't use unsalted passwords/keys/hashes." > "Don't use the time as the salt." > > > On Tue, Jan 13, 2015 at 2:30 PM, Hans-Christoph Steiner < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> The big Chinese chat app WeChat uses SQLCipher-for-Android to store its >> messages. But unfortunately, they just generate a password with local, >> public >> info. Here's a good example of how not to implement SQLCipher! >> >> >> http://articles.forensicfocus.com/2014/10/01/decrypt-wechat-enmicromsgdb-database >> >> .hc >> >> -- >> PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D 8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81 >> https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81 >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Guardian-dev mailing list >> >> Post: [email protected] >> List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev >> >> To Unsubscribe >> Send email to: [email protected] >> Or visit: >> https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/chris.kuethe%40gmail.com >> >> You are subscribed as: [email protected] >> >> > > -- PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D 8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81 https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81 _______________________________________________ Guardian-dev mailing list Post: [email protected] List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev To Unsubscribe Send email to: [email protected] Or visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/archive%40mail-archive.com You are subscribed as: [email protected]
