Like any full disk encryption for linux and also android can only be really effective if the device is shutdown. This is because:
- the disk encryption key is in RAM and can be extracted from there (see cold boot attack - while I haven't heard about cold boot attacks against android, it's better to be careful since an attacker could just keep the android connected to power and shielded from any internet and it would never shut down - the bootup disk encryption password is probably a lot longer and more complex than any lockscreen password for reasons of practicality Before an Android is taken away there might be enough time for an emergency procedure. - For example a very long press of some physical key such as the off key could result of the disk encryption masterkey (luks header) being wiped and the device shut down. That would make any attempts to extract the key from RAM as well as brute force attacks against the disk encryption futile. Of course some safeguards against accidental wipe would be nice such as being able to abort the procedure by having a configurable timeout of a few seconds to enter a PIN which aborts. - If one is forced to reveal an unlock PIN, one could reveal a PIN which actually wipes the encryption masterkey (luks header) and shuts the device down. - A voice command for triggering the emergency procedure.
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