Panicz Maciej Godek <[email protected]> writes: > 2014-03-23 19:07 GMT+01:00 Grant Rettke <[email protected]>: >> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 2:26 PM, Panicz Maciej Godek >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> And hence my question: is there any way to restrict >>> the execution environment of eval, e.g. to specify >>> which symbols should be available? (For security >>> reasons, I wouldn't want functions like "system" >>> or "exit" to be present in that environment) >>> >>> Or perhaps there's some better way to do that? >> >> How did you end up achieving your goal? > > Oh, with Guile it turned out to be a piece of cake ;] > It's thanks to first-class modules and the fact that a module can be > provided as the second argument to eval. > Guile actually has e.g. (ice-9 safe-r5rs), which exports a safe subset > of Scheme, and (ice-9 null), which provides the most basic syntactic > bindings and no functions whatsoever. > > So it is possible to either create a module in runtime using > make-fresh-user-module and add all the necessary bindings, or to have > some regular module prepared and obtain it using resolve-module.
It turns out that it's trivial to access any binding from any module, even from code evaluated in a module with a restricted set of bindings. http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/guile-devel/2012-05/msg00041.html I regret calling it a "Psyntax security hole", since Guile has never claimed to support secure sandboxing, but it's something to keep in mind. I'd like to add support for secure sandboxing in a future version of Guile, but in the meantime you'd better run it in a VM or container if that's what you want. Mark
