I read this 3rd party security advisory about libtiff:

http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/10/LibTIFF-Code-Execution.html

This patch fixes CVE-2016-5652, which is a buffer overflow with
potential for remote code execution.

You can easily view the commit in this unofficial Git mirror of the
libtiff CVS repo:
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/b5d6803f0898e931cf772d3d0755704ab8488e63

Unfortunately, that's the closest thing to an "official" upstream
reference to the bug that is viewable in a web browser that I can find.

I had to also take the previous change to the affected file, since the
bug fix commit depended on those changes.

This patched libtiff does _seem_ to work properly; I viewed a TIFF file
with it.

One of the bugs in that Talos advisory, CVE-2016-8331, is apparently
still not fixed upstream. And CVE-2016-5875 appears to me to be fixed by
our patch for CVE-2016-5314 [0].

[0]
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2554
From 7abe86a8d93e1a1ed11f14ec7ede22ce9b020611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Leo Famulari <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2016 19:23:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] gnu: libtiff: Fix CVE-2016-5652.

* gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5652.patch: New file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
* gnu/packages/image.scm (libtiff/fixed)[source]: Use it.
---
 gnu/local.mk                                     |  1 +
 gnu/packages/image.scm                           |  3 +-
 gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5652.patch | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5652.patch

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index a64b7ec..1942131 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -657,6 +657,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA =                                           
\
   %D%/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5314.patch             \
   %D%/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5321.patch             \
   %D%/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5323.patch             \
+  %D%/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5652.patch             \
   %D%/packages/patches/libtiff-oob-accesses-in-decode.patch    \
   %D%/packages/patches/libtiff-oob-write-in-nextdecode.patch   \
   %D%/packages/patches/libtool-skip-tests2.patch               \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/image.scm b/gnu/packages/image.scm
index 873a7f2..3a1209f 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/image.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/image.scm
@@ -234,7 +234,8 @@ collection of tools for doing simple manipulations of TIFF 
images.")
                          "libtiff-CVE-2016-3991.patch"
                          "libtiff-CVE-2016-5314.patch"
                          "libtiff-CVE-2016-5321.patch"
-                         "libtiff-CVE-2016-5323.patch"))))))
+                         "libtiff-CVE-2016-5323.patch"
+                         "libtiff-CVE-2016-5652.patch"))))))
 
 (define-public libwmf
   (package
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5652.patch 
b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5652.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54b87d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-5652.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Fix CVE-2016-5652 (buffer overflow in t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile()).
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-5652
+
+Patches exfiltrated from upstream CVS repo with:
+cvs diff -u -r 1.92 -r 1.94 tools/tiff2pdf.c
+
+Index: tools/tiff2pdf.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.92
+retrieving revision 1.94
+diff -u -r1.92 -r1.94
+--- a/tools/tiff2pdf.c 23 Sep 2016 22:12:18 -0000      1.92
++++ b/tools/tiff2pdf.c 9 Oct 2016 11:03:36 -0000       1.94
+@@ -2887,21 +2887,24 @@
+                               return(0);
+                       }
+                       if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, 
&jpt) != 0) {
+-                              if (count > 0) {
+-                                      _TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count);
++                              if (count >= 4) {
++                    /* Ignore EOI marker of JpegTables */
++                                      _TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count - 2);
+                                       bufferoffset += count - 2;
++                    /* Store last 2 bytes of the JpegTables */
+                                       table_end[0] = buffer[bufferoffset-2];
+                                       table_end[1] = buffer[bufferoffset-1];
+-                              }
+-                              if (count > 0) {
+                                       xuint32 = bufferoffset;
++                    bufferoffset -= 2;
+                                       bufferoffset += TIFFReadRawTile(
+                                               input, 
+                                               tile, 
+-                                              (tdata_t) &(((unsigned 
char*)buffer)[bufferoffset-2]), 
++                                              (tdata_t) &(((unsigned 
char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]), 
+                                               -1);
+-                                              buffer[xuint32-2]=table_end[0];
+-                                              buffer[xuint32-1]=table_end[1];
++                    /* Overwrite SOI marker of image scan with previously */
++                    /* saved end of JpegTables */
++                                      buffer[xuint32-2]=table_end[0];
++                                      buffer[xuint32-1]=table_end[1];
+                               } else {
+                                       bufferoffset += TIFFReadRawTile(
+                                               input, 
-- 
2.10.1

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: PGP signature

Reply via email to