Haproxy and weakdh/logjam

Hi,

Everyone has probably heard about the recently disclosed weakdh/logjam
attack [0] already. Here are a few personal thoughts on the impact on
Haproxy.

The weakdh issue is twofold:

- if the HTTPS server is willing to accept a cipher suite using a very
weak Diffie-Hellman (DH) group, like for example
TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, then it is possible for an
adversary in position of man-in-the-middle (MitM) to downgrade the
security level of a given connection to this cipher suite, thus reducing
the security to 512-bit DH ;

- a nation-state adversary may be able to pre-compute all the possible
values of a commonly-shared 1024-bit DH group, thus being able to
decrypt all exchanges using that group.

The first point depends on the cipher suite specified by the
administrator with the "ssl-default-bind-ciphers" or "ciphers"
parameters. I strongly encourage everyone to use the modern cipher suite
described on the Mozilla wiki [1]. Please at least consider using the
"Intermediate" one.

In the default configuration, Haproxy uses a 1024-bit DH key generated
from the second Oakley group [2] for Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (DHE) key
exchange. This group is widely used, and is likely to be the first
target for pre-computation by an adversary with large enough computing
capabilities. I would advise using instead a 2048-bit key generated from
the MODP group 14, by setting the tune.ssl.default-dh-param parameter to
2048, or even disabling DHE altogether if you are expecting every client
to support ECDHE key exchange. Note that increasing the
tune.ssl.default-dh-param will increase the CPU load on your server, and
may therefore increase the connection establishment latency.

If you cannot increase the DH key size above 1024-bit, please at least
generate a custom DH group with the "openssl dhparam 2048" command, and
add the result of this command to your certificate file.

Best regards,

[0]: https://weakdh.org/
[1]: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
[2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2409#section-6.2

-- 
Remi

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