Hello! As a lurker on this list I've always kind of wondered what the policy is for releasing new containers to address security patches on dependencies like this. I'm not sure who maintains the "official" containers for HAProxy but would they do a re-release of the latest versions to include a patch on a dependency like OpenSSL?
Thanks, -Paul > On Mar 25, 2021, at 7:28 AM, Lukas Tribus <lu...@ltri.eu> wrote: > > FYI > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: OpenSSL <open...@openssl.org> > Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2021 at 15:03 > Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory > To: <openssl-proj...@openssl.org>, OpenSSL User Support ML > <openssl-us...@openssl.org>, OpenSSL Announce ML > <openssl-annou...@openssl.org> > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > OpenSSL Security Advisory [25 March 2021] > ========================================= > > CA certificate check bypass with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT (CVE-2021-3450) > ======================================================================== > > Severity: High > > The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag enables additional security checks of the > certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default. > > Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in > the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added > as an additional strict check. > > An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a > previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA > certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check > that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates. > > If a "purpose" has been configured then there is a subsequent opportunity > for checks that the certificate is a valid CA. All of the named "purpose" > values implemented in libcrypto perform this check. Therefore, where > a purpose is set the certificate chain will still be rejected even when the > strict flag has been used. A purpose is set by default in libssl client and > server certificate verification routines, but it can be overridden or > removed by an application. > > In order to be affected, an application must explicitly set the > X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT verification flag and either not set a purpose > for the certificate verification or, in the case of TLS client or server > applications, override the default purpose. > > OpenSSL versions 1.1.1h and newer are affected by this issue. Users of these > versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k. > > OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue. > > This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 18th March 2021 by Benjamin Kaduk > from Akamai and was discovered by Xiang Ding and others at Akamai. The fix was > developed by Tomáš Mráz. > > > NULL pointer deref in signature_algorithms processing (CVE-2021-3449) > ===================================================================== > > Severity: High > > An OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation > ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2 renegotiation ClientHello > omits > the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial > ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL > pointer dereference will result, leading to a crash and a denial of service > attack. > > A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation enabled (which > is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted by this > issue. > > All OpenSSL 1.1.1 versions are affected by this issue. Users of these versions > should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k. > > OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue. > > This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 17th March 2021 by Nokia. The fix was > developed by Peter Kästle and Samuel Sapalski from Nokia. > > Note > ==== > > OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. > Extended > support is available for premium support customers: > https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html > > OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind. > The impact of these issues on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed. > > Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1. > > References > ========== > > URL for this Security Advisory: > https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210325.txt > > Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional > details > over time. > > For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: > https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEhlersmDwVrHlGQg52cTSbQ5gRJEFAmBcl6sACgkQ2cTSbQ5g > RJGvnAgAtG6I7rfokDC9E5yB26KC3k0Vasfq5iH/aZz0CNRyOokWJBUyyNIVjqr0 > 2eZP7VsQT7zRM+tgh9c8MwH3FIghtpwJRJls4qZDHKoXts7JH4Ul4NLPd546x7xA > GcKNwTD4NkZbTqtZ72NTgliInzrj0MCC8jqQrIIkcAIleGNzvZ0f64jdE+vBXoqX > M2FOhWiA/JkAKtB3W7pthIt25qkOwHbrpTy+UUp/S5QD779NJ/EOYcsOFBRfLZiP > gA6QILuW2L55lhG6Y2u+nVE3UI2hqd2hGgSAvDIPr2lVJxq0LQpgHca7Gj5bfIRo > GLDz7n0FhN6n7NBqetP+nlHmYivcSg== > =XIXK > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >
