Hi,

HAProxy 3.0.31 was released on 2026/11/18. It added 93 new commits
after version 3.0.30.

This release is made of a subset of the fixes shipped in 3.2.27.

It starts with four important fixes. A peer could send a message whose
payload did not fit in the channel once the buffer reserve was accounted
for: the stream was then marked as waiting for room although nothing had
been transferred, a state that can never be resolved. The H2, H3 and QUIC
multiplexers treated it as an internal error and killed the worker; they now
report a regular stream error. In the same conditions a hard assertion in
the buffer shift code could fire, which is now relaxed to only reject truly
impossible moves. Crashes could be experienced because of these issues, so
do not delay the upgrade.

The rest of the release fixes a cache poisoning with "process-vary",
connection failures with QUIC behind wildcard listens, truncated or stalled
HTTP/1 responses, malformed HTTP/3 traffic crashing the process, a leak of
file descriptors, and a few other issues that can exhaust resources over
time.  Two behaviour changes deserve attention: "cache-use"/"cache-store"
rules are now rejected in "defaults" sections, and the HTTP/1 parser now
rejects more invalid request targets. It also synthesizes a missing Host
header from the request target, so host-based rules apply to what is really
sent to the server.

* buf/muxes: A stream could be left waiting for room that could never come.

  When data could not be moved from a receive buffer to the channel because
  the channel was empty but its reserve left no usable room, the stream was
  flagged as waiting for room even though nothing had been transferred, and
  that state could never be resolved. The H2, H3 and QUIC multiplexers
  detected it as an internal error and aborted the process. They now report
  a stream error, so only the affected stream is closed. Under the same
  conditions, a hard assertion in the buffer shift code could also fire; it
  is relaxed to only reject truly impossible moves. Reported with a
  reproducer and a fix proposal by Adam Crawford; the buffer assertion was
  found by code analysis (Yuqi Qiu and Xiang Li, Nankai University).

* cache: With "process-vary on", a cached variant could be delivered to
  clients it was not meant for.

  When a server varies its response on different headers depending on the
  request (typically "Vary: Origin" added only when an Origin header is
  present, as most CORS implementations do), a variant stored for one client
  was delivered to every client of the resource, whatever its Origin or
  Referer. Any client could thus poison the cache for all the others,
  breaking the CORS checks of legitimate sites or mixing contents meant for
  different referrers. This requires "process-vary" (not the default), but
  must be considered as a cache poisoning issue for deployments that enable
  it.

  Two other cache bugs were fixed: a configuration with two "cache-use"
  rules that both hit leaked an applet and a cache row on every request,
  until memory and cache space were exhausted (any client could trigger it
  by requesting cached objects), and "show cache" could crash or skip
  entries when several caches were configured. Finally, "cache-use" and
  "cache-store" rules declared in a "defaults" section never worked and
  could crash or silently break caching; they are now rejected with an
  explicit alert at startup, so they must be moved to the proxies.

* mux-h2/h3: Host and path based rules could be bypassed when forwarding
  absolute URIs.

  When an HTTP/2 request carried an absolute URI (e.g. "GET
  http://host/path";), the authority and the path sent to the server were not
  extracted the same way as HAProxy's own analyzers do it: the authority
  stopped at the first '/' instead of the first '/', '?' or '#', and the
  userinfo was stripped up to the first '@' instead of the last one. A
  request evaluated by HAProxy for one host or path could therefore be
  delivered to the server with another one, bypassing host and path based
  rules. The mux now splits absolute URIs exactly like the HTTP analyzers
  do.

* h1: Invalid request targets were accepted and a Host header could be missing.

  Several ambiguous or invalid request targets were accepted and forwarded
  as-is to the server. An absolute http(s) URI with an empty host ("GET
  http:///admin/x";) was accepted, although servers using WHATWG-style URL
  parsers see another host and path in it: this parser differential may be
  used to bypass host or path based rules. CONNECT requests whose target was
  not exactly "host:port" ("CONNECT internal:[email protected]:443", "CONNECT
  allowed.com:443/x", or an empty host) were also accepted, while the Host
  header was validated against a different value. These requests are now
  rejected with a 400, or only captured when "option
  accept-unsafe-violations-in-http-request" is set.

  In addition, when a request carried no Host header but an authority in its
  target (absolute-form, or the authority-form of CONNECT), the rules saw no
  host at all and could not match the real target. A Host header is now
  synthesized from the authority, with the default port removed, so that
  rules apply to what is actually sent to the server.

* quic: Retry, version negotiation and stateless reset were emitted from the
  wrong source address.

  When a QUIC listener is bound to a wildcard address, the address targeted
  by the client must be used as source for all the datagrams of the
  connection, otherwise the kernel picks one from the route to the
  client. This matters when the host has several addresses, typically VIPs
  configured on a loopback interface behind a load balancer in direct
  routing mode: QUIC clients usually use connected UDP sockets and silently
  drop datagrams coming from another address. Packets emitted before any
  connection exists (Retry, Version Negotiation and Stateless Reset) did not
  honour this and were sent without a source address. As a result, such
  clients never received the Retry (handshakes were retried until giving up,
  intermittently when "quic-force-retry" or the retry threshold was
  involved), could not downgrade to a supported version, and were not
  notified of a stateless reset after a restart with a cluster-secret (they
  waited for their idle timeout instead).  Binding the individual addresses
  instead of, or in addition to, the wildcard one was the workaround.

* quic: Several crashes, handshake stalls and timeouts were fixed.

  A client retiring two connection IDs in the same packet could make HAProxy
  build a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame from an already freed connection ID
  (duplicate IDs with the pool cache, or freed heap contents sent to the
  peer otherwise). An unset loss timer could also hide a real one and make
  the server loop on padded Initial packets without ever retransmitting the
  Handshake data, stalling the handshake for minutes with some clients, and
  ACK_ECN frames carrying optional ranges were misparsed.

* h3: Malformed HTTP/3 traffic reaching the glitch threshold could kill the
  process.

  When a SETTINGS or QPACK decoding error was detected, or an unknown frame
  was received, the glitch was counted before the connection error was
  set. If the count reached "tune.quic.{fe,be}.sec.glitches-threshold", the
  glitch handler set the connection error first and the caller set it again:
  the internal consistency check that forbids it aborted the process,
  remotely triggerable by any client. The error is now always set before the
  glitch is reported. A stream reset while output was blocked could still
  emit STREAM frames after RESET_STREAM, in violation of the advertised
  final size.

* h3: Transfers could be corrupted or never complete.

  Encoding trailers could corrupt memory when data was still present in the
  send buffer, and valid trailers could close the connection with an
  internal error when no room was left; a trailer block larger than a buffer
  could loop forever before the watchdog fired. The "maxrewrite" limit is
  now enforced on request headers, and the :path pseudo-header is checked
  for all scheme values (it was only checked for http and https, so an
  invalid path was accepted with any other scheme). Finally, a request
  stream closed with a standalone FIN before any valid request or response
  was received is now rejected instead of being treated as an empty complete
  message, so it no longer stays accounted and its memory is released
  promptly.

* mux-quic: The shutdown timeout and soft-stop wakeups were fixed.

  The shut-timeout was reset on every activity, so a connection being closed
  could stay open indefinitely, and streams were not woken on soft-stop when
  the listener socket was used, delaying worker termination until their own
  timeouts.

* mux-h1: Responses could be truncated, and transfers stalled.

  Several cases led to a client receiving a truncated response: a soft-stop
  while the last response was still being downloaded released the connection
  and dropped the remaining data; a message truncated by the server but with
  data still pending was cut too. A pipelined request ending exactly at the
  end of the buffer was not parsed until "timeout http-request" (or was
  rejected with a 414 on a valid request), and draining more than one buffer
  of request data left the remaining data and the next pipelined request
  unprocessed until the client timeout. Chunked responses are no longer sent
  to HTTP/1.0 clients (RFC9112 forbids it): they are now
  close-delimited. Error responses (e.g. 400) were not sent at all when the
  payload could not be parsed or when a content-length had already been
  read; they are now emitted before the connection closes, which also lets
  health checks report an invalid response immediately instead of a
  timeout. A 101 response following a "100 Continue" in the same segment was
  rejected with a 502 because the websocket key was searched in the wrong
  message, and "option idle-close-on-response" is now honoured during a
  soft-stop combined with "close-spread-time".

* mux-h1/h1: Other robustness fixes.

  - "h1-case-adjust" rules now match header names regardless of case, as the
    documentation states.
  - A request trailer named like "http-send-name-header" is no longer forwarded
    after the header added by HAProxy.
  - "option accept-unsafe-violations-in-http-{request,response}" remains
    effective on the final response after a 1xx, and after parsing restarted on
    a full output buffer.
  - The Connection/Upgrade header cleanup is now idempotent when the headers
    are received in several parts.
  - In TCP mode, the Upgrade header is no longer modified in flight while HTTP
    sample fetches are evaluated.
  - An FCGI response whose headers arrive in several parts no longer loses its
    content-length.
  - No 408 is sent or logged when a connection that is already closed times
    out, so "408 <BADREQ>" log lines and failed request counters are no longer
    inflated.
  - Fast-forwarding is no longer left disabled for the following streams once
    one could not use it (performance only).
  - The "h1_open_streams" counter exposed in the stats no longer drifts (and
    can no longer become negative) when a stream cannot be created.
  - "%Ti" and "%Tt" are now correct for streams on an H2/H3 frontend with an H1
    server.
  - Reads are no longer subscribed after a read0 or an error, which could
    theoretically spin until the server responds.
  - Data are no longer transferred by swapping buffers when room is reserved
    for a chunk size.
  - A NULL opposite endpoint is no longer dereferenced in fast-forwarding.

* ssl: Certificate management from the CLI and inherited server settings were
  fixed.

  When "commit ssl cert" was interrupted (e.g. the CLI client closed the
  connection) after building its new instances in several passes, the freed
  transaction was still referenced: the next certificate command on the same
  certificate could crash the process or corrupt memory. A certificate used
  by more than 10 instances was enough to make the command multi-pass.

  On the server side, "curves", "sigalgs" and "client-sigalgs" inherited
  from "default-server" were not duplicated, leading to a use-after-free
  when the original context was destroyed; they were also leaked when
  redefined on a server line. Finally, when a QUIC listener served two
  certificates matching the SNI, the RSA one was selected instead of the
  ECDSA one if no "ssl-max-ver" was set.

* ssl: A new "ocsp-update.timeout" global option bounds OCSP fetches.

  The HTTP client used to fetch OCSP responses during automatic updates had
  a connect timeout but no server timeout: a response starting but never
  completing could hang forever. This task is shared by the whole update
  queue, so a single stuck responder blocked all further OCSP updates.
  "ocsp-update.timeout" (10 seconds by default, bare numbers are
  milliseconds like for the other timeouts) now bounds the whole fetch, and
  a slow responder is simply retried later following the
  "ocsp-update.mindelay/maxdelay" rules.

* peers: Stick-table updates could be lost or misapplied between peers.

  When an update carrying a "server_key" did not fit in the peer's output
  buffer, the new dictionary entry was kept in the transmission cache while
  the value was never sent. The remote peer then resolved its identifier to
  an unknown or stale entry, losing the server name for the whole session
  (or associating it with another server). In addition, when a peer
  reconnected, the sync task deadline was overwritten by each peer, so
  heartbeats to idle peers could be delayed until the remote peer closed the
  connection for inactivity. On the stick-table side, the dictionary
  reference held by "server_key" was only released on one destruction path,
  so memory grew with the number of distinct values that went through the
  table.

* resolvers: Name resolution could fail, crash, or read out of bounds.

  With a "resolve-net" list mixing IPv4 and IPv6 networks, a record was
  ignored as soon as a network of the other family was met before a matching
  one, so the server never got an address and stayed in maintenance
  (e.g. "resolve-net 2001:db8::/32,10.0.0.0/8" with "resolve-prefer
  ipv4"). A server of a proxy using a SRV name but without "resolvers"
  keyword was kept attached to the SRV request of the other servers: the
  first SRV response could then crash the process, and a reload with a
  server state file crashed too. Finally, "do-resolve" with a
  client-controlled value such as hdr(host) could build a DNS name with a
  256-byte label or an embedded NUL, leading to out-of-bounds reads and
  disclosure of heap data in DNS queries.

* mux-fcgi: Responses were truncated for slow clients.

  The FCGI connection timeout was enforced even when streams were still
  attached. With a slow client, HAProxy stops reading from the FastCGI
  server once buffers are full, nothing happens on the connection for a
  while, and it was killed in the middle of the response: the client
  received a truncated response, logged as "SD--", and the server got a
  reset while blocked in write(). The timeout is now only enforced when no
  stream remains attached, as already done for H2; a FastCGI server that
  does not answer at all still gets a 504 after "timeout server".

* stream/hlua/bwlim: Several busy loops ending in a watchdog kill were fixed.

  With a filter engine bound to "on-http-response" (e.g. SPOE) and an H2
  backend answering early and resetting its stream while the request body
  was still being uploaded, the stream spun until the watchdog killed the
  worker. The analysis timer is now reset when analysers are stripped on
  error, and "http-response" actions get a final chance when the server
  dies.  The same analysis-timer reset used to drop an auto-close that
  forwarded shutdowns on the request error path, which could freeze a stream
  with no analyser left; auto-close is restored. A Lua filter using
  "filter.wake_time()" could also leave the analysis timer armed after it
  was done with the channel, causing a busy loop long after the filter
  finished; wake-ups are now armed on the stream task instead. The bandwidth
  limitation filter could report more data than the channel held when a
  shared limitation used a burst size, corrupting the channel and spinning
  at 100% CPU.

* fd/connection: A descriptor leak could exhaust "maxsock", and a descriptor
  could be closed twice.

  When an accepted connection could not be prepared, for instance because
  "maxsslconn" was reached, its file descriptor was left open. Incoming
  connections on that listener kept accumulating leaked descriptors even
  after SSL connections were released, until "maxsock" was exhausted, which
  also prevented non-SSL frontends from accepting. Conversely, when a
  connection failed during a health check and the socket had already been
  closed, the descriptor could be closed a second time, closing an unrelated
  file descriptor.

* task: A task could be destroyed twice in master-worker mode.

  A task already flagged as killed but still linked in a queue could be
  destroyed a second time when a forked child cleans the tasks before
  executing (master-worker mode with a "peers" section and a local
  peer). This aborted the child with SIGILL on older branches; the leftover
  window is now closed by ignoring already-killed tasks, which the scheduler
  frees when dequeuing them.

* samples: A crash and two wrong results were fixed in converters.

  The time converters ("ms_ltime", "us_ltime", "ms_utime", "us_utime") did
  not check that the formatted result was available, so a configuration
  using a long format (e.g. many "%N") accepted by "haproxy -c" crashed the
  process on the first request evaluating it; a failed allocation had the
  same effect with an ordinary format. "jwt_member_query" only checked one
  of the two error codes of the base64 decoder, and the "ungrpc" converter
  could return a field taken from the wrong message when a body carried
  several gRPC messages.

* cfgparse: Unsupported password hashes are rejected.

  "crypt()" may return NULL or an error token for unsupported hash types (on
  Debian/Ubuntu, strings starting with '*'), and this was not checked, so a
  user or group password using such a hash was accepted at startup and could
  never authenticate. It is now detected during configuration validation.

* mcli: The master CLI freeze with a program section and peers is
  covered by a test.

  A non-regression test now reproduces the child process abort reported in
  the task section: starting a forked program while a peers section and a
  local peer are configured killed that child with SIGILL before it could
  exec.  Nothing changes for users, the test only ensures the fix above
  stays.

It is strongly recommended to upgrade to this version. Crashes could be
experienced because of the four fixes listed first. No configuration change
is needed to benefit from them, and none of them alters the protocol or the
configuration syntax: any 3.0.x build can be replaced in place. Deployments
exposing HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 to the Internet, and those enabling the cache with
"process-vary", should treat this release as mandatory.

Thanks everyone for your help on this release.

Please find the usual URLs below :
   Site index       : https://www.haproxy.org/
   Documentation    : https://docs.haproxy.org/
   Wiki             : https://github.com/haproxy/wiki/wiki
   Discourse        : https://discourse.haproxy.org/
   Slack channel    : https://slack.haproxy.org/
   Issue tracker    : https://github.com/haproxy/haproxy/issues
   Q&A from devs    : https://github.com/orgs/haproxy/discussions
   Sources          : https://www.haproxy.org/download/3.0/src/
   Git repository   : https://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy-3.0.git/
   Git Web browsing : https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-3.0.git
   Changelog        : https://www.haproxy.org/download/3.0/src/CHANGELOG
   Dataplane API    : 
https://github.com/haproxytech/dataplaneapi/releases/latest
   Pending bugs     : https://www.haproxy.org/l/pending-bugs
   Reviewed bugs    : https://www.haproxy.org/l/reviewed-bugs
   Code reports     : https://www.haproxy.org/l/code-reports
   Latest builds    : https://www.haproxy.org/l/dev-packages


---
Complete changelog :
Aleksandar Lazic (1):
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-fcgi: do not enforce the timeout on connections with 
streams

Alex Szakaly (1):
      MEDIUM: ssl: add ocsp-update.timeout global option

Amaury Denoyelle (14):
      BUG/MEDIUM: h3: fix BUG_ON() crash with glitch on SETTINGS parsing
      BUG/MEDIUM: h3: fix BUG_ON() crash with glitch after QPACK dec err
      BUG/MINOR: h3: fix risk of BUG_ON() crash with glitch on unknown frame
      BUG/MINOR: h3: fix BUG_ON() crash with glitch on htx_set_eom() failure
      BUG/MEDIUM: h3: fix memory corruption on trailers parsing realign
      BUG/MINOR: mux_quic: wake streams on soft-stop using listener socket
      BUG/MINOR: h3: enforce maxrewrite on request headers
      BUG/MAJOR: h3: always check :path for all scheme values
      BUG/MEDIUM: h3: prevent conn failure on trailers decoding without space
      BUG/MINOR: h3: do not retry on trailers too large
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux_quic: do not reset timeout after shut
      BUG/MINOR: quic: fix ACK_ECN parsing after optional ack ranges
      BUG/MAJOR: mux_quic: remove data not yet sent on reset stream
      BUG/MEDIUM: h3: reject standalone FIN on invalid request/response

Chris Staite (1):
      BUG/MEDIUM: ssl/cli: reset the ongoing transaction when "commit ssl cert" 
is interrupted

Christopher Faulet (40):
      BUG/MEDIUM: h1: make the Connection/Upgrade headers cleanup idempotent
      BUG/MINOR: h1: keep accepting unsafe violations after a parser reset
      BUG/MEDIUM: h1: don't rewrite the Upgrade header when not cleaning headers
      BUG/MEDIUM: h1-htx: don't stall on messages ending exactly at the 
buffer's end
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: don't truncate the response when closing after 
draining
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: don't truncate responses on soft-stop
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: only reset the session's timing info on the frontend 
side
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: fix the open streams counter on stream creation failure
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: don't dereference a NULL opposite sedesc in 
h1_fastfwd()
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: don't lose the end of the previous chunk in 
h1_make_chunk()
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: don't stall when draining more than a buffer of data
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: don't keep fast-forwarding disabled for the next 
streams
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: don't report a 408 error on timeout of a closed 
connection
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: don't swap buffers when transferring data with a 
reserved offset
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: don't lose error responses once a content-length was 
parsed
      BUG/MINOR: h1: forget a previous pass' results when parsing headers only
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: don't send chunked responses to HTTP/1.0 clients
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: convert the <from> argument of h1-case-adjust to lower 
case
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: only rely on the client's method for bodyless responses
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: search the websocket key in the right message
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: don't forward request trailers named like server name 
header
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: don't spread-close idle conns with 
idle-close-on-response
      BUG/MINOR: mux-h1: Don't subscribe for receives once read0 or error 
received
      BUG/MEDIUM: bwlim: never burst more than the pending data in input
      BUG/MEDIUM: h1: reject CONNECT request targets other than "host:port"
      BUG/MEDIUM: h1: build a missing Host header from the authority of the URI
      BUG/MINOR: h1: reject CONNECT authorities with an empty host
      BUG/MEDIUM: h1: reject absolute http(s) URIs with an empty host
      BUG/MEDIUM: connection: don't leak the fd of an accepted connection
      BUG/MEDIUM: hlua/filters: Never arm the analysis timer for the lua 
wake-ups
      BUG/MINOR: http-ana: also set FINAL on http-response actions on server 
error
      BUG/MEDIUM: resolvers: detach servers without resolvers from the SRV 
request
      BUG/MEDIUM: resolvers: don't ignore records not matching a resolve-net 
family
      BUG/MEDIUM: cache: fix "show cache" crash/skip with several caches
      BUG/MEDIUM: cache: do not create a second applet when two cache-use rules 
hit
      BUG/MEDIUM: cache: forbid cache rules in defaults sections
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: Report EOS when a demux error is handled by the app 
layer
      BUG/MAJOR: cache: do not mix variants varying on different headers
      BUG/MEDIUM: stream: reset analyse_exp when analysers are stripped on error
      BUG/MEDIUM: stream: keep channel_auto_close() on the request error path

Frederic Lecaille (5):
      BUG/MEDIUM: peers: keep the earliest sync task deadline
      BUG/MEDIUM: peers: do not keep a dict entry cached when its update was 
not sent
      BUG/MINOR: sample: realign the ungrpc converter on message boundaries
      BUG/MEDIUM: quic: fix loss time selection in quic_loss_pktns()
      BUG/MINOR: stick-table: release server_key on any stksess destruction

Gihyeon Ryu (1):
      BUG/MAJOR: quic: don't reference a retired CID from a NEW_CONNECTION_ID 
frame

Martin Mirchev (1):
      BUG/MINOR: sample: fix NULL dereference in the ltime/utime converters

Olivier Houchard (4):
      BUG/MEDIUM: resolvers: reject too long labels when encoding a name
      BUG/MAJOR: mux-h2: split absolute URIs like the HTTP analysers do on 
output
      BUG/MEDIUM: fd: Mark a fd as dead on early close
      BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: don't drop pending output on a short content-length

Remi Tricot-Le Breton (1):
      BUG/MINOR: sample: Fix wrong 'base64urldec' return value check in 
'jwt_member_query'

William Lallemand (13):
      BUG/MEDIUM: task: do not destroy twice the tasks already killed in 
mworker_cleantasks()
      REGTESTS: mcli: check that a program section works with a peers section
      DOC: configuration: document AWS-LC compatibility restrictions
      BUG/MINOR: ssl: copy curves, sigalgs and client_sigalgs in 
srv_ssl_settings_cpy()
      BUG/MINOR: ssl: free curves, sigalgs and client_sigalgs in 
ssl_sock_free_srv_ctx()
      BUG/MINOR: ssl: free curves, sigalgs and client_sigalgs in srv_parse_*()
      BUG/MINOR: quic/ssl: record TLS version bounds for certificate selection
      BUG/MINOR: cfgparse: detect unsupported crypt() hashes on Debian/Ubuntu
      BUG/MINOR: ssl: exclude wolfSSL from custom extension support
      SCRIPTS: vtest: allow overriding the Git repository URL
      CI: github: use haproxytech/VTest2 for regression tests
      CI: github: use haproxytech/VTest2 for musl regression tests
      REGTESTS: ssl: disable crt-list curves test with AWS-LC

Willy Tarreau (5):
      BUILD: makefile: better support git worktrees
      BUG/MAJOR: buf: make the shift distance check less strict in b_move()
      BUG/MAJOR: h3: do not panic on HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR after htx_xfer()
      BUG/MAJOR: mux-quic: fail on impossible data transfers in rcv_buf()
      BUG/MAJOR: mux-h2: fail on impossible data transfers in rcv_buf()

Yeonggi Kim (6):
      MINOR: quic: use the listener for Retry and Version Negotiation emission
      MINOR: quic: define a function to emit a datagram on a listener socket
      BUG/MEDIUM: quic: use datagram destination as source for Retry
      BUG/MINOR: quic: use datagram destination as source for stateless reset
      BUG/MINOR: quic: use datagram destination as source for version 
negotiation
      BUG/MINOR: quic: handle EINTR on emission of packets without connection

--
Christopher Faulet



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