2009/2/19 Rick R <rick.richard...@gmail.com> > I think the capabilities community including E and Coyotos/BitC have > extensively addressed this topic. Coyotos is taking the correct approach for > trusted voting platform. Since, even if your software is trustworthy, it > can't be trusted if the OS on which it runs is suspect.
Woah, that's a pretty interesting question! How do you write software which is protected against a malicious operating system (mind -- not erroneous, but rather somebody detecting the software you're running and changing your vote). Maybe some sort of randomized cryptographic technique, in which, with high probability, the OS either runs your program correctly or causes it to crash. Luke > However, we might have a few more rigged elections before we see any > deliverables from Coyotos. > > > On Thu, Feb 19, 2009 at 2:45 AM, Ketil Malde <ke...@malde.org> wrote: > >> Rick R <rick.richard...@gmail.com> writes: >> >> > I'm sure Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold) can provide us >> with >> > an online voting solution. >> >> You know, while the recent voting scandals have been milked for all >> they're worth by the open source community, FP has been very quiet >> about it. Isn't this an application where correctness matters? How >> about a proof that the software never loses (or injects) votes, for >> instance? >> >> -k >> -- >> If I haven't seen further, it is by standing in the footprints of giants >> > > > > -- > We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we > created them. > - A. Einstein > > _______________________________________________ > Haskell-Cafe mailing list > Haskell-Cafe@haskell.org > http://www.haskell.org/mailman/listinfo/haskell-cafe > >
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