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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HDFS-11357?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=15833847#comment-15833847
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Hadoop QA commented on HDFS-11357:
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| (x) *{color:red}-1 overall{color}* |
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|| Vote || Subsystem || Runtime || Comment ||
| {color:blue}0{color} | {color:blue} reexec {color} | {color:blue}  0m  
0s{color} | {color:blue} Docker mode activated. {color} |
| {color:red}-1{color} | {color:red} patch {color} | {color:red}  0m  4s{color} 
| {color:red} HDFS-11357 does not apply to trunk. Rebase required? Wrong 
Branch? See https://wiki.apache.org/hadoop/HowToContribute for help. {color} |
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|| Subsystem || Report/Notes ||
| JIRA Issue | HDFS-11357 |
| JIRA Patch URL | 
https://issues.apache.org/jira/secure/attachment/12848743/0001-HDFS-secure-delete.patch
 |
| Console output | 
https://builds.apache.org/job/PreCommit-HDFS-Build/18240/console |
| Powered by | Apache Yetus 0.5.0-SNAPSHOT   http://yetus.apache.org |


This message was automatically generated.



> Secure Delete
> -------------
>
>                 Key: HDFS-11357
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HDFS-11357
>             Project: Hadoop HDFS
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>            Reporter: Andrew Purtell
>            Assignee: Andrew Purtell
>            Priority: Minor
>         Attachments: 0001-HDFS-secure-delete.patch
>
>
> Occasionally for compliance or other legal/process reasons it is necessary to 
> attest that data has been deleted in such a way that it cannot be retrieved 
> even through low level forensics (for some reasonable definition of this that 
> typically excludes the resources a state actor can bring to data recovery). 
> HDFS at-rest encryption offers one way to achieve this, if the data keying 
> strategy is highly granular. One simply "forgets" a key corresponding to a 
> given set of files and the data becomes irretrievable. However if HDFS 
> at-rest encryption is not enabled or a fine grained keying strategy is not 
> possible, another simple strategy can be employed. 
> The objective is to ensure once a block is deleted no trace of the data 
> within the block exists on disk in unallocated regions, for all blocks, 
> providing assurance deleted data cannot be recovered at any time through 
> reasonable effort even with low level access. 



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