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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HDFS-4680?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13724992#comment-13724992
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Hadoop QA commented on HDFS-4680:
---------------------------------
{color:red}-1 overall{color}. Here are the results of testing the latest
attachment
http://issues.apache.org/jira/secure/attachment/12595129/hdfs-4680-1.patch
against trunk revision .
{color:green}+1 @author{color}. The patch does not contain any @author
tags.
{color:green}+1 tests included{color}. The patch appears to include 1 new
or modified test files.
{color:green}+1 javac{color}. The applied patch does not increase the
total number of javac compiler warnings.
{color:green}+1 javadoc{color}. The javadoc tool did not generate any
warning messages.
{color:green}+1 eclipse:eclipse{color}. The patch built with
eclipse:eclipse.
{color:green}+1 findbugs{color}. The patch does not introduce any new
Findbugs (version 1.3.9) warnings.
{color:green}+1 release audit{color}. The applied patch does not increase
the total number of release audit warnings.
{color:red}-1 core tests{color}. The patch failed these unit tests in
hadoop-common-project/hadoop-common hadoop-hdfs-project/hadoop-hdfs:
org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.server.namenode.TestFsck
{color:green}+1 contrib tests{color}. The patch passed contrib unit tests.
Test results:
https://builds.apache.org/job/PreCommit-HDFS-Build/4751//testReport/
Console output: https://builds.apache.org/job/PreCommit-HDFS-Build/4751//console
This message is automatically generated.
> Audit logging of delegation tokens for MR tracing
> -------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: HDFS-4680
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HDFS-4680
> Project: Hadoop HDFS
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: namenode, security
> Affects Versions: 2.0.3-alpha
> Reporter: Andrew Wang
> Assignee: Andrew Wang
> Attachments: hdfs-4680-1.patch
>
>
> HDFS audit logging tracks HDFS operations made by different users, e.g.
> creation and deletion of files. This is useful for after-the-fact root cause
> analysis and security. However, logging merely the username is insufficient
> for many usecases. For instance, it is common for a single user to run
> multiple MapReduce jobs (I believe this is the case with Hive). In this
> scenario, given a particular audit log entry, it is difficult to trace it
> back to the MR job or task that generated that entry.
> I see a number of potential options for implementing this.
> 1. Make an optional "client name" field part of the NN RPC format. We already
> pass a {{clientName}} as a parameter in many RPC calls, so this would
> essentially make it standardized. MR tasks could then set this field to the
> job and task ID.
> 2. This could be generalized to a set of optional key-value *tags* in the NN
> RPC format, which would then be audit logged. This has standalone benefits
> outside of just verifying MR task ids.
> 3. Neither of the above two options actually securely verify that MR clients
> are who they claim they are. Doing this securely requires the JobTracker to
> sign MR task attempts, and then having the NN verify this signature. However,
> this is substantially more work, and could be built on after idea #2.
> Thoughts welcomed.
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