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From: Mohammed Fauzi
Sent: Friday, February 25, 2005 2:14 PM
Subject: Chat Shows, Nashid Groups, and Lite Preaching Egypt's Air-Conditioned Islam* By Hossam Tammam, Patrick Haenni** February 16, 2005 The hijab that was the symbol of the Islamic awakening of the 1970s - has now become emblematic Egypt's political scene changed fundamentally in the second half of the 1990s. The murder of tourists in Luxor in 1997 led, paradoxically, to the end of violence by Islamist groups. The "young generation" of Islamists (al-jil al-jadid) went over to the principles of liberal democracy that were the basis for the programs of all the parties that tried to set themselves up under the banner of religion: Al-Wasat (the Center), Al-Islah (Reform) and Al-Shariah (Religious Law). The Muslim Brothers, the most important of the Islamist organizations, which have been simultaneously repressed and tolerated, are making pacts with their former devils: they have forged alliances with the secular leftwing Tagammu Party during campaigns of solidarity with Palestine, and on February 27, 2003 with the ruling National Democratic Party of President Hosni Mubarak in the great rally at the Cairo stadium against United States' intervention in Iraq. Between Official and Political Islam The competition between official and political Islam, which shaped the dynamics of Islamization in Egypt over the past 25 years, was undermined by these changes. The protagonists in this cold war have been disqualified: Al-Azhar, the heart of official Islam, is under fire for its compromises with the regime; among the young in Cairo its ulama (scholars) are seen as out of date, living in an ivory tower. In political Islam the Muslim Brothers, tarnished by links, more supposed than real, with the violence that has shaken Egypt, have lost the aura they had in the 1980s. And the radical groups have either disappeared or retreated to the margins of the Muslim world (for example, the faction of the Jihad group outside Egypt, under Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, allied itself with Osama bin Laden). New religious players have appeared: charismatic preachers with a style similar to American televangelists; performing artists who have "re-Islamized" themselves; middle-class women who have set up as preachers and invented a new tradition, the Islamic salon, now a feature of middle-class life; musical preaching groups; and highly educated "independent" Islamists. These people have four things in common: almost all come from secular parts of the educational establishment and have acquired their knowledge of religion by themselves; they are young, from privileged backgrounds and socially integrated; they are trying to combine the characteristic teachings of different cultural models with Islam, which then loses its centrality; and they claim to have broken both with official and political Islam. But the values of this trend are far from revolutionary. Instead they are the disenchanted, here-now gone-tomorrow yuppie values: hedonism, individual ease, and consumption. We are moving away from the era of politics. Hijab and Fashion Business The issue of the Islamic headscarfâthe hijab that was the symbol of the Islamic awakening of the 1970sâhas now become emblematic. It no longer signals rejection of the West as it did then, but instead signifies a non-Islamist way of being Muslim: the end of an obsession with identity and an _expression_ of the realities of globalization, market reform, and consumerism. The hijab has been reappropriated by the fashion business, although it is still sometimes sold outside mosques. In boutiques that cater for women who veil, the hijab is now designed to the standards of international fashion. The shops have English or French names: Al-Muhajabah Home, Al-Salam Shopping Center, Flash, L'Amour. All far from the identity program of the Islamists or the ethics of modesty. These "liberal veiled women" (al-muhajabbah al-mutaharrirah) have exhausted the patience of fundamentalists by wearing Paris-designed scarves and speaking to their children in English. They are condemned both by the activists of the Muslim Brothers and traditional preachers trying to invoke the omniscience of God. Nashid: A Broader Scope Similarly, the nashid (religious chant) has been ideologically deprogrammed and adjusted to globalization. The old custom of chanting, inherited from the Sufis, was taken up in the 1970s by Islamist groups on university campuses, who were inspired by the writings of the many Islamist militants then in prison, with their references to jihad, martyrdom, and heroism, and their condemnation of the arbitrariness of government. For a decade it was all politicsâjust as it was for the headscarf when it first appeared on the campus. The words of the chants were militant and criticized the state, and there were no musical instruments, which were deemed illegal. Later, influenced by the Islamic-nationalist music of the first Palestinian Intifada (1988-91), the nashid was musically accompanied, first by tambourines, then drums, then synthesizers. At the end of the 1980s two performing groups were formed and were sought after in Islamist circles to play at the "Islamic marriages" that started a new fashion. The themes of the nashid were modified, and love, happiness, and poetry appeared. This was partly to suit the less activist younger generation, but also because militant slogans did not fit the formalities of Egyptian marriage ceremonies. In the later 1990s the groups became more professional, widened their range of instruments, began to charge for performances, and sold audio-cassettes. In 1990 there were just two groups: now there are about 50. They have left jihad and its repertoire behind, and compete with Egyptian pop starsâand like those stars, they waver between a romantic mood and bursts of nationalism alluding to Palestine and Iraq. Nashid groups have less religious names than beforeâAl-Wa`d (Promise) or Al-Gil (Generation) are now common; their music continues to fuse with non-Arab rhythms, Anglo-Saxon pop, jazz, and rap. Super-Cool Preaching Amr Khalid, 36, the 'super cool' preacher This entry, both with the hijab and the nashid, into consumerism and syncretism with non-Arab models, has led to an implicit questioning of the old puritanism of the 1970s and 1980sâand above all a questioning of the principle of the ideologization of religion. The change is important: we could trace similar patterns in the Islamic economy, increasingly affected by the ups and downs of international finance; or in Islamic charity, which has been rethought, within a framework of neoliberalism, as a security net to replace the state's withdrawal from this area (a withdrawal the Islamists have widely supported). Among a section of the religious middle classes this change resembles the familiar Western New Age religiosity in the way it borrows from other cultures (such as Asian spirituality). Magda Amer, a young, middle-class woman preacher from Cairo, is keen on chakras,1 yoga, reflexology, and macrobiotic food. Her courses on Islam and alternative medicine attract well-heeled women who attend the Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq Mosque in the affluent suburb of Heliopolis where she preaches. Amr Khaled, 36, from a solid middle-class background, has taken this change to the limit with his super-cool preaching, which invokes the Protestant work ethic and self-awareness. In just four years he has become the most popular preacher in the Arab world and beyond. The secret of his success was that he positioned himself outside the rivalry between political and official Islam, by offering a religious product compatible with the modern expectations of the urban middle classes: a worldly religion that talks about inner peace and spiritual well-being, and rejects religious observance in which rite is an end in itself. It refuses to see Allah as a God of retribution. Khaled does not want to look like a traditional sheikh; he prefers to be close-shaven rather than bearded; wears a suit and tie, not a white galabiyya; speaks Egyptian dialect, not classical Arabic. He has broken with the classic Salafi style of preaching, adopting a softer style in which God is love. Copying the style of the US televangelists, he was the first to bring a religious chat show to the Arab worldâa formula quickly taken up by all who call themselves the "new preachers" (including Khaled Al-Guindy, Al-Habib Ali and Safwat Hegazy). His main message is that we must "reconcile religion and life." Observance does not mean sacrifice but small adjustments; being religious does not mean giving up the pleasures of life. That is why he likes to be photographed wearing a football shirt and with a soccer starâa way of concretely expressing the balance between body and spirit. All this is far from jihad, or even just politics, as noted by the sheikh from Al-Azhar who, a little cynically, spoke of Khaled's da`wah diet (light preaching); the Muslim Brothers call it "air-conditioned Islam." Khaled's only project is to address the trendy young of Cairo or Alexandria through a religious discourse that talks of the values of self-realization that are part of liberal modernity: ambition, wealth, success, hard work, efficiency, and self-awareness. He offers them the model of virtuous wealth and salvation through deeds. One of his followers explains bluntly: "Wealth is a gift from heaven and a rich Muslim will spend his fortune in the cause of God and in charitable deeds." That is Khaled's intention. In a rush of enthusiasm, he told his followers, "I want to be rich so that people will look at me and say 'You see, rich and religious,' and they'll love God through my wealth. I want to have money and the best clothes to make people love God's religion." Khaled attaches importance to effort and the efficient use of time, and crusades against useless leisure and too much sleep. Like an entrepreneur, he believes that "the first thing, in building a serious life, is to define objectives, and write them down." He calls on his followers to be "productive in the help you give to friends, productive in doing deeds, productive in developing society." He praises the value of ambition: "One of the proofs of God's love is that it encourages you to be ambitious, gives you the ambition to reach ever higher, to raise yourself ever higher in society." Khaled certainly has been successful: his sermons are now protected by copyright, he has set up several companies for distributing audio-cassettes, he is religious adviser to the Saudi firm Iqra and in demand on the boards of directors of Islamic banks. As a religious entrepreneur who sanctifies market values within the framework of depoliticized preaching, Khaled has become a media product, and he certainly sells. LBC, the chain founded by Christian Lebanese militias, unhesitatingly sacrificed its religious loyalties to the god of profit: last Ramadan, it broadcast Khaled's Islamic chat show, Wa Nalqa Al-Ahibba (Meeting the Loved Ones), to woo audiences in the Gulf states and to maximize its advertising revenues. A US-Style Da`wah Abdullah Gymnastiar, does not only preach, he also gives courses in management and motivation. This sort of preaching is not just an Egyptian phenomenon. For the past five years Islamist publishers have been enthused by the idea of management. A former Muslim Brother, Muhammad Abdel Gawad, publishes an Islamized version of this in booklets with titles such as The Secrets of Efficient Administration During the Life of the Prophet and The Prophet's Management of Human Relations. In Morocco similar pamphlets tell you to put Divine Blessing to the Service of Business, and in the Gulf an Islamist publisher sells The Ten Habits of a Successful Person. In Indonesia the most sought-after of Jakarta's trendy preachers, Abdullah Gymnastiar, does not only preach; he also gives courses in management and motivation. In Egypt state religious institutions have not escaped: at the Ministry of Waqfs,2 reform projects now concentrate more on the social role of the mosque, civil society, and self-sufficiency. One of their seminars at Al-Azhar University focused on rethinking da`wah (preaching), using the precepts of US-style marketing. There may be something to be said for these ways of affirming religion. And the syncretism that is creeping into new manifestations of the return to Islam may make us smile. But what we are seeing is not so much the rise of an Islamic humanism, more an Islamized renewal of economic liberalism. And this is happening in a climate of severe and increasing social inequalities that urgently need an alternative solution to resist neoliberal globalization. Thoughtful young Islamists show growing interest in movements that seek alternative solutions in the anti-globalization debate, such as Al-Janub (the South), an organization oriented towards the third world. Their interest may still focus on recreating a utopia founded on Islam, but freed from its old obsession with identity. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- * This article was originally published in September 2003 at the Le Monde diplomatique, English Edition. ** Hossam Tammam,the Editor of the Cultural page of islamonline.net (Arabic Section) ** Patrick Haenni,is a researcher in the French Center of Economic, Juristic and Social Studies and Documentations (CEDEJ). [1] Sanskrit term meaning "wheel," which, according to eastern medicine, is a centre of energy promoting health and psychological well-being. [2] The waqf is the regulating body for Islamic religious properties and endowments. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- All views expressed herein belong to the individuals concerned and do not in any way reflect the official views of Hidayahnet unless sanctioned or approved otherwise. 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