On 07/22/2014 10:28 AM, Ted Lemon wrote:
On Jul 8, 2014, at 11:06 AM, James Cloos <[email protected]> wrote:
If those doing IP over Amateur Radio are a use case, they require NULL.
If Amateur Radio's prohibition on encryption is considered to be important in
making decisions about crypto in protocols, then I think we are in a situation
where we can't have crypto protocols that don't disallow downgrade attacks,
because implementations always have to be willing to downgrade to no encryption
if the other endpoint is an Amateur Radio station.
So, by reductio ad absurdum, I claim that this isn't something the working
group should consider as a deciding factor. I think the same observation also
applies to Michael's comment about debugging on stacks with limited trace
capability. If you need to disable encryption, you should have to do
something fairly extraordinary to make that happen.
It is a switch to request integrity only. Or to only allow integrity
only. Either party MUST be able to reject an integrity only negotiation.
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