Hi Kathleen, thank you for your comment.

On 09/13/2016 12:22 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-hip-multihoming-11: No Objection
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> I'm wondering if split-tunneling should be listed as a security
> consideration.  I see the following in section 4.1 that might be used to
> help prevent split tunneling:
>    In the outbound direction, as a result of SPD processing, when
>    an outbound SA is selected, the correct IP destination address for
>    the peer must also be assigned.
> Then also the entirety of section 4.3.
> I read this as split tunneling could be an issue in some circumstances
> depending on policy and it might be good to mention this in the security
> considerations section.  Or let me know if I am missing some background
> that would prevent split tunneling so implementers don't need to be made
> aware of this consideration.

>From my recollection, support (or prevention) of split tunneling was not a 
>consideration of these parts of the text.  The first sentence you quote from 
>4.1 was intended as a hint to implementers that there is this additional level 
>of indirection with HIP that must be managed (mapping of SA to IP address) 
>when multihoming is in use.  Section 4.3 is mainly about how to manage the 
>possibly large number of valid SA configurations that could arise from 

My understanding of the common use of the term 'split tunneling' is that it 
pertains to VPN tunnel situations where some set of connections should be 
tunneled but others not.  In HIP, the security association is end-to-end and 
the same VPN scenario is not applicable, so by split tunnel, do you mean that 
some transport sessions between two hosts are within HIP/ESP protection and 
others not?

- Tom

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