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UNDILAH PAS DAN BARISAN ALTERNATIF
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ULASAN: Rencana di bawah memaparkan pandangan beberapa orang bekas
pegawai tinggi tentera di negara arab. Mereka menyatakan kenapa
Amerika sekarang menghadapi kesukaran mengatur strateji perang di
Iraq kerana beberapa faktor. Antaranya mereka mendapat maklumat salah
bahawa rakyat Iraq sendiri akan menyambut baik kedatangan tentera
Bersekutu untuk menggulingkan Saddam Hussein. Sebaliknya mereka
merasa terkejut kerana mendapat penentangan hebat daripada rakyat
Iraq. Rancangan asal tentera Bersekutu ialah membuat serangan se-
rentak dari banyak penjuru, terutama sekali dari pihak utara Iraq.
Tapi, tentera Bersekutu tidak dapat berbuat begitu kerana ada
masalah dengan negara Turki yang tidak membenarkan mereka masuk
ke utara Iraq melalui Turki dan bilangan tentera Bersekutu yang
menceroboh utara Iraq tidak berupaya menentang tentera Iraq di sana,
ini membantutkan serangan serentak pada asalnya dirancang. Kebetulan
berlakunya ribut pasir yang menyekat kemaraan mereka. Akibatnya
mereka sedang berada dalam keadaan kelam kabut di bumi Iraq. Hanya
mereka menunggu tentera tambahan untuk mengukuh kedudukan mereka
yang kian tergugat.
=======
http://www.islam-online.net/English/News/2003-03/31/article05.shtml
By Asif Farooqi, IOL Correspondent
AMMAN, March 31 (IslamOnline.net) - Wrong U.S. perception about the
common Iraqi reaction to the invasion, un-availability of a northern
front to the invading forces and rising morale of the Iraqi forces
are being counted by retired Arab military strategists among a set
of reasons which forced the U.S. and allied military leaders to
rethink their war strategy, resulting in new and delayed time line
for an end to the military action.
"When a military plan looses some factors which are at the very
heart of it, they have to think again and they have to make a major
alteration to that plan. Any military plan is adjustable to small
changes but if it suffers from a major change, it means the planning
is not good," said the former commander of the Jordanian War College,
Major General Abdul Jalil. He was among several retired senior Arab
generals interviewed by the agency to know what the senior military
leaders- who have experience of serving in this area think of the
war in Iraq.
Heart Of The Plan
Almost unanimity of the view was found among these general at least
on one point. The U.S. army went in to Iraq with some poor intelli-
gence and analysis work on the supposed support they were told to get
from the Iraqi public.
Another factor outlined particularly by General Jalil was the unavail-
ability of a "northern front" to the invading forces. This was at the
very heart of the initial military plan but as the Turks backed out
of their earlier �commitment� of allowing U.S. forces to advance to
the northern Iraq through the Turkish territory, the coalition forces
were left with no choice but to make big changes in their original war
strategy, he added. U.S.-led forces was supposed to push as many as
60,000 elite troops into northern Iraq from Turkey. And this according
to General Jalil, was the "heart of the plan".
Now that front not available to the coalition forces, general Jalil
who also served in the Jordanian army as chief of Operations, said for
this reason the coalition had to bring in fresh forces in as big number
as 120,000.
"Practically it is very difficult to maintain a supply line as long as
the coalition forces now have between Umm Qasr to the outskirt of
Baghdad. If they were to put up good fight around and inside Baghdad,
they would have to have a more secure supply line at a close location"
General Jalil said.
Another "illusion" the coalition forces were out in was the support
from the Iraqi public which never came forth as was told to them
would be. "Iraqi people did not welcome these invading soldiers as
the coalition forces were expecting. In fact they (civilians) fought
the invaders and gave them a tough time" said Lt Gen Musa Al Adwan,
former commander of the brigade of the Jordanian Special Forces.
"It was a big mistake on the part of coalition forces to perceive that
the Iraqi civilian would welcome them in the cities and towns of Iraq.
This misleading piece of intelligence and analysis brought disaster
for the invading forces as far as their war planning is concerned,"
general Musa said.
He was of the view that in anticipation of a local support, the
coalition military planner were thinking of taking the towns of Umm
Qasr and Basra in the very initial days of war but that did not happen.
"In my view, the U.S. military wanted to move their military base
from Kuwait to Basra as soon as in the first week of war so that they
can go ahead with more force and determination" general Jalil said
while agreeing to the point that it couldn't have worse for any mili-
tary to go into an enemy country with the expectation in mind that
they were going into a friendly country.
According to general Musa, the first seven days of the war were very
crucial and the way the Iraqis fought in Umm Qasr it raised the morale
of the Iraqi troops to highest levels. "This morale is perhaps the
toughest enemy coalition forces be faced with while fighting in Iraq"
general Musa said.
How long the war could long. No one is sure but one thing becomes clear
after talking to the military experts it won't be as short as originally
planned.
"I think it would be two months before coalition forces would be able
to achieve any of their goals" general Musa was of the opinion.
"It is a simple calculation. The coalition forces spent 6 days to
secure Umm Qasr which is a village and hundred times weaker than
Baghdad" general Jalil said. "How long should Baghdad take to fall"
he asked.
General Musa thinks that the US forces were misguided to engage the
enemy in smaller towns in the south. "I think while their prime target
is Saddam Hussein and his regime and their mission is to get Saddam
their strategy should have been to arrive Baghdad as shortly as pos-
sible". General Musa said by engaging enemy in smaller towns in the
south coalition forces would be spending a lot of time fighting there
which would result in causalities on both sides. "Thus I believe any
allied mission if they take a long time they will loose the interna-
tional support and opinion would change in Iraq and Saddam would have
opportunity to gather people around him" he said.
General Jalil praised the Iraqi war strategy which he said was fast
turning into "active defense". "This is the best defense against a
more powerful enemy" general Jalil said and added that movement of
smaller units towards the enemy frontlines was a signal that Saddam
not only was moving his army in smaller numbers but was moving them
in the direction of the frontline which would raise the morale of his
troops and have negative psychological impact on the enemy forces.
"Their strategy is different from 91 wars. This time around Saddam and
his commanders have selected to fight in smaller units in a round in
the cities and not in the deserts as he did in the last was and lost
many soldiers" general Musa said. He explained that city by city, the
coalition forces would have to defeat Iraqis at every front and it
will take very long when they can finally reach Baghdad" he said.
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