Research Fellow in Verified Operating System Security

The seL4 project and I am seeking a highly motivated postdoctoral
researcher to investigate methods for proving that operating system
kernels can defend against timing channels. We are seeking somebody
with a research background in formal methods and security.

You will contribute to the development of methods for reasoning about
timing channels in verified operating system kernels, applied to the
seL4 kernel. Your work will also investigate how to extend seL4’s
existing proofs of information flow security, which primarily cover
storage channels, to also encompass timing channels.

Further details about the research project are summarised in the
following position paper:

Gernot Heiser, Gerwin Klein and Toby Murray.
"Can We Prove Time Protection?" in Proceedings of the
Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS),
pages 23-29, May 2019.

The position is for two years in the first instance, based at the
University of Melbourne under Dr Toby Murray
(  You will work with a
close-knit team here at University of Melbourne, and collaborate
heavily with UNSW and Data61’s Trustworthy Systems group, in Sydney.

Candidates should have experience in at least one of the following:
 - program verification (e.g. Hoare logic)
 - information flow security (e.g. non-interference)
 - interactive theorem provers (e.g. Isabelle, Coq, etc.)

Applications close on August 30, 11:55pm Australian Eastern Standard
Time (GMT +10)

Informal enquiries should be directed to
  Toby Murray

Toby Murray, DPhil (University of Oxford)
Senior Lecturer, School of Computing and Information Systems
University of Melbourne

hol-info mailing list

Reply via email to