Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-homenet-prefix-assignment-07: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-homenet-prefix-assignment/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- - section 3: I expected some security text here, not to say that this all needs to be encrypted but rather to say that because this is flooding, you can't really encrypt it and that hence this scheme is only suited for smaller deployments and/or those with lower layer security already in place. (And hence also probably small.) - section 3: Similarly, you could also add some privacy text to the effect that this scheme only applies where the privacy characteristics of the various prefixes involved are all roughtly similar, that is, where there's no real privacy difference in which prefixes end up with which nodes. (Mind you, I need to ponder that a bit myself to see if it's really the case;-) - sections 4 & 5: I found this impossible to understand in a (quick) linear reading. I'd find actual code easier tbh. It's interesting that Barry found this clear though (I did not, clearly:-) so this isn't a discuss. But why didn't you first provide an overview of the algorithm? - Where is the evidence that the algorithm converges? I'd have thought there would be a reference to an academic publication that also described the algorithm and a proof for convergence. _______________________________________________ homenet mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet
