Andrew Sullivan <a...@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
>> On 24/01/18 13:32, Michael Richardson wrote:
>> >
>> > b) DNS naming and delegation in Last Call.
> All of it, or just the simple one? I think the timeframe for "simple"
> is "soonish" and the "real" one from the architecture document might
> well be "heat death of the universe". Also, I think the "real" one is
> going to interact badly with a number of security issues, so I am not
> too convinced that we will be able to do the "real" one without
> working some on the use cases.
I think it's sufficient for the WG to think that we got something done, and
if we split up the work and defer it, then fine. If we need security work to
make the more "real" one work right, then that's good *input* to the security
work, and we could have an ID with an empty section that waits for awhile,
but we have otherwise reached WG consensus on.
>> Reasonable points. Do others (dis)agree?
> Only a little:
>> other bits of work need to be fully finished - if we know
>> what kind of keying that'll be used in the final results,
>> we could make some progress, but I do agree we'd need to
> I disagree to the extent I agree with the above. That is, I think it
> is reasonable to work on things as it starts to be clear what else we
> can rely on.
It sounds like we should write a security "results" document.
This would be a kind of requirement document on the security work, but more
to the point, it would detail what other work could depend upon.
{ps: the AmazonEcho/GoogleHome/Mycroft/etc. devices seem like ideal platforms
to be the root of a secure network. I suspect that there are boostrap
issues with the ones that do all the processing in the cloud}
--
Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
-= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
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