http://www.rockfordinstitute.org/News/Trifkovic/NewsST091901.htm http://www.rockfordinstitute.org/News/Trifkovic/News&Views.htm Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture September 19, 2001 OSAMA BIN LADEN: THE BALKAN CONNECTION by Srdja Trifkovic So we are at war. Terrorism is the enemy, personified by Osama Bin Laden. But before America commits its treasure and risks the lives of its young men ("and women") to this epic struggle, a few stables need to be cleaned and some unpleasant skeletons removed from government cupboards. Bill Gertz, writing in yesterday's (9/18) Washington Times, proves conclusively that Osama bin Laden's terrorist network is thriving in Albania. It is not enough to bewail the fact that bin Ladens rise was facilitated by the hefty support he received from the CIA in the 1980's. At that early stage one could justify the policy--mistaken and shortsighted, as it turned out to be--by the dictates of the Cold War: your enemys enemy is your de facto ally, if not a trusted friend. "Blowback" was a risk, but arguably worth taking two decades ago. But if we are to take the war on terrorism seriously today, it is also necessary: 1. To acknowledge that throughout the 1990s the Clinton Administration had tolerated, and effectively aided and abetted bin Ladens operations in the Balkans, long after he was recognized as a major security threat to the United States; 2. To name the instigators of such policy in Washington, and to ensure that none of them remain in any positions of responsibility as President Bush plans his response to the recent outrage; and 3. To recognize that the Balkan policy of successive U.S. administrations -- the policy that had made this scandalous connection possible and, in a way, inevitable--was fundamentally flawed, and requires urgent revision. BIN LADEN AND BOSNIA In the aftermath of Americas "Black September" it was confirmed in Sarajevo that the Muslim authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina had issued a passport to Osama bin Laden at the Bosnian embassy in Vienna in 1993. The intention was obviously to facilitate the movements of a man who was fast acquiring the reputation of a dangerous terrorist. That the government in Sarajevo was sympathetic to Islamic militants is neither surprising nor remarkable, of course, but in this particular case there was an old debt to be repaid. Osama Bin Laden was an early supplier of weapons to the Bosnian Muslims. His early efforts in 1992-93 were known to the Clinton administration and quietly tolerated by it. He was given a free hand in the Balkans and eventually established a strong foothold in the heart of Europe, initially under the guise of humanitarian work. The facts of the case were known to the media. In the summer of 1996, the Washington Post confirmed that "the Clinton administration knew of the activities of a so-called Relief Agency which was, in fact, funneling weapons and money into Bosnia to prop up the Izetebegovic Muslim government in Sarajevo." It was funneling troops, too. The mujahideen had first come to Bosnia in 1992 and numbered over 3,000 by the summer of 1995. They included volunteers from the Middle East, as well as deserters from the Turkish, Malaysian and French UNPROFOR units. They never took prisoners: wounded Serb soldiers were usually decapitated. Under the Dayton Peace Accords, all Islamic volunteers who fought with the Muslim government army were supposed to leave the country. An undisclosed number remained, however, having been given Bosnian citizenship and permanent residence. Several hundred had taken over what was the Serbian village of Bocinja Donja, in central Bosnia, and provided instruction to local Muslim forces in terrorist activities. They first attracted attention when on December 18, 1995--only a month after Dayton--a car bomb prematurely exploded in the central Bosnian town of Zenica. It was apparently meant for American troops stationed nearby, as revenge for the sentencing of Sheik Omah Abdel Rahman in connection with the World Trade Center bombing. Two months later, in February 1996, SFOR units raided the training center of the Bosnian governments secret police (AID), located near Fojnica. Several persons were arrested for preparing terrorist actions. It transpired that instructors from the Middle East were teaching AID officers how to disguise bombs as toys and ice cream cones. Only months later the Bosnian Connection started making an impact abroad. Reporting on the bombing of the Al Khobar building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the New York Times reported on June 26, 1997, that several suspects had served with the Bosnian Muslim forces and were linked to Osama Bin Laden. From that point on the United States and its allies had complained periodically and ineffectually to the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo about the continued presence of the mujahadeen in Bosnia. By late 1999 this connection attracted further attention when U.S. law enforcement authorities discovered that several suspects who have visited or lived in Bosnia were associated with a terrorist plot to bomb targets in the United States on New Years Day. Among them was Karim Said Atmani, who was identified by authorities as the document forger for a group of Algerians accused of plotting the bombings. He is a former roommate of Ahmet Ressemi, the man arrested at the Canadian-U.S. border in mid-December 1999 with a carload of explosives. Atmani has been a frequent visitor to Bosnia, even after Ressmis arrest. Another Bosnian veteran, a Palestinian named Khalil Deek, was arrested in Jordan in late December 1999 on suspicion of involvement in a plot to blow up tourist sites; a second man with Bosnian citizenship, Hamid Aich, lived in Canada at the same time as Atmani and worked for a charity associated with Osama Bin Laden. A third suspect, an Algerian named Abu Mali, was regarded as a "community leader" in the Bosnian village of Bocinja. Mehrez Amdouni, yet another former resident, was arrested in September 1999 in Istanbul, where he arrived with a Bosnian passport. It has been confirmed that Ahmet Ressemi had ties with Said Atmani, another terrorist who fought in the El Mujahadeen unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Canadian authorities deported Atmani back to Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 18, 1998, supposedly without knowing of his alleged participation in terrorist activities through Europe. The New York Times Magazine reported on February 6, 2000 that "last year, sources in Jordan say, the Mukhabarat, the intelligence service, alerted the C.I.A. to at least three plots by Bosnian-based Islamic terrorists to attack U.S. targets in Europe." While an elaborate Islamic terror network was developing in Bosnia, Osama bin Laden was busy looking for fresh opportunities in the Balkans. The victims would remain the same; and yet again he could count on the quiet complicity of the U.S. government. BIN LADEN AND KOSOVO: "ADMINISTRATION FULLY AWARE" During the NATO war against Serbia, in May 1999, U.S. Sen. Jim Inhofe warned that if American troops go into Kosovo theyd be fighting alongside a terrorist organization known to finance its operations with drug sales--including some to the United States. Inhofe was one of the few legislators to note and complain that by joining hands with the KLA the United States also would become partners of a sort with Osama bin Laden. Six months before the bombing, the Jerusalem Post reported that Bosnia was the first bastion of Islamic power in the former Yugoslavia, but Kosovo promised to be the second ("Kosovo seen as new Islamic bastion" by Steve Rodan, September 14, 1998). The Albanians have been provided with financial and military support from Islamic countries, the report went on, and they were bolstered by hundreds of mujahadeen infiltrated from Albania. "US defense officials say the support includes that of Osama Bin Laden" and the Defense Department confirmed that bin Ladens Al Qaida organization supported Moslem fighters in both Bosnia and Kosovo. The report quoted sources in Washington as saying that the Clinton administration was fully aware of the Islamic militantsactivities in Bosnia and Kosovo, but had looked the other way: "The administration wants to keep the lid on the pot at all costs . . . Needless to say, the Europeans have been quite upset by this." The usually well-informed Israeli paper correctly sensed a shift in U.S. policy that facilitated bin Ladens activities. In early 1998, the State Department had listed the KLA as an international terrorist organization that supported itself with drug profits and through loans from known terrorists like bin Laden. By the end of that year the policy was reversed, however. On November 30, 1998, the Scotsman reported that the KLA "had the unusual honour of being taken off a register of organisations the US defines as terrorists. This is a valuable asset, not just in terms of public relations. It also makes fund-raising among ethnic Albanians abroad much easier." The KLAs rehabilitation in Washington went hand-in-hand with its growing links with the Islamic radicals. The Sunday Times of London reported on March 22, 1998, that Iranian Revolutionary Guards had joined forces with Osama bin Laden to support the Albanian insurgency in Kosovo, hoping "to turn the region into their main base for Islamic armed activity in Europe." By November the same paper confirmed that bin Ladens terrorist network in Albania was regularly sending units to fight against the Serbs in Kosovo. The paper pointed out that bin Ladens Albanian operation dated back to 1994, when its was established under the guise of a wealthy Saudi humanitarian agency. In those early days bin Ladens group enjoyed the support of then premier Sali Berisha--also an American "asset" at that time--and the main KLA training base was subsequently established on Berishas property in northern Albania. Correctly sensing that the anti-Serb course of the Clinton administration would lead it to tolerate his activities in Albania and Kosovo, bin Laden issued a communiqué in August 1998 listing Serbia among "the worst infidel nations." The communiqué, faxed to Knight Ridder from bin Ladens supporters in London and translated from Arabic, boasted of "great victories" in Bosnia and Kosovo. By the end of 1998, as the United States was building up its pressure on Belgrade to accept the Clinton administrations terms on the beleaguered Serbian province, the Times of London reported (November 26, 1998) that the Islamic fighters who "created havoc in the war in Bosnia" were moving on to Kosovo. The link between Osama bin Laden and the KLA were facilitated by the chaotic conditions in the neighboring Albania, the Times went on, allowing Muslim extremists to settle there, often under the guise of humanitarian workers. "They were terrorists in 1998 and now, because of politics, theyre freedom fighters," a top U.S. drug official complained to the Washington Times in May 1999. By that time the NATO bombing was in full swing, however, and the mujahideen were once again American allies. According to the Washington Times, "The reports said bin Ladens organization, known as al-Qaeda, has both trained and financially supported the KLA. Many border crossings into Kosovo by foreign fighters also have been documented and include veterans of the militant group Islamic Jihad from Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan. Many of the crossings originated in neighboring Albania and, according to the reports, included parties of up to 50 men." Bin Laden has become an integral attachment to each KLA operation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that he has established a presence in Macedonia, the latest victim of the flawed U.S. policy. The Washington Times wrote on June 22 of this year that the NLA (the KLA subsidiary in Macedonia) was largely--but not exclusively--dependent on the illegal trade in narcotics: "In addition to drug money, the NLA also has another prominent venture capitalist: Osama bin Laden." The sum supplied was estimated at between six and seven million dollars over six months. In the aftermath of the tragedy in New York and Washington, it is certainly desirable, and perhaps even possible, for the United States to devise an effective anti-terrorist strategy. This cannot be done, however, unless there is a change of the policy that breeds terrorism. A decade of American covert and overt support for the Muslims in the former Yugoslavia has been a foreign policy disaster, detrimental to peace in the Balkans and to American interests. Its beneficiaries are Osama bin Laden and his co-religionists in Sarajevo, Tirana, Pristina and Tetovo. If we are to take the "war on terrorism" seriously, the mistakes of the past need to be recognized and rectified. THE END ==^================================================================ EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?bUrHhl.bVKZIr Or send an email To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] This email was sent to: archive@jab.org T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
