http://www.rockfordinstitute.org/News/Trifkovic/News&Views.htm NATO AFTER 9-11: POLITICAL ALLIANCE OR MILITARY PACT? by Srdja Trifkovic October 19, 2001 On the eve of the terrorist attacks on September 11 the administration of President George W. Bush seemed confident that it could expand NATO, scrap the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and build the proposed missile defense system--the misgivings of Russia, China and other nations notwithstanding. "I just don't believe that vulnerability of the American people to ballistic missiles is a rational policy," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared on Fox News Sunday on September 9. "We are going to make to the Russians and others an offer about a new strategic framework that we think is appropriate," national security adviser Condoleezza Rice echoed him on NBC's Meet the Press on the same day; "We hope it's an offer they can't refuse." Her unfortunate turn of phrase accurately reflected the mood in Washington. Officials were confident that they could abrogate the ABM treaty one way or another, and had threatened to unilaterally withdraw from it to free the Pentagon to carry out unfettered missile defense research and testing. At first it would seem that nothing much has changed in the Administration's attitude in the aftermath of September 11: * On October 11 President Bush declared that "the case is more strong today than it was on September the 10th that the ABM is outmoded, outdated, reflects a different time" and that America needs the means to shoot down any incoming rocket. * After the talks that NATO Secretary-General George Robertson had in Washington with Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rice, and a group of senators on October 12, a senior NATO official assured reporters that the President supposedly remains fully committed to the NATO expansion: "Enlargement came up and the administration said 'make no mistake, we are all supportive. We haven't changed our mind.' More than ever this enlargement makes sense because it enhances our common security" the official told reporters. * In his statement to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees (October 4) Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz mentioned "Usama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong I" in the same breath three times, in order to present and justify the proposed missile defense system as an integral part of the struggle against terrorism. * The recently appointed U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Alexander Vershbow, still insists that the overall U.S. agenda with Russia remains unchanged. Soon after the attacks he stated that the U.S. will push ahead with its missile defense program that demands ABM abrogation, that it will push for NATO expansion, and that it will continue opposing Russian actions in Chechnya. A casual observer might conclude that the new spirit of cooperation Moscow and the West in the fight against terrorism did not prompt Mr. Bush to re-examine the key tenets of his team's policy in Eastern Europe, and in particular to defer or scale down the next wave of NATO expansion, due to be launched at the next summit in Prague in November 2002. NATO diplomats now even claim that--in addition to all three former Soviet Baltic republics--Slovakia and Slovenia are certain to join, and perhaps Bulgaria and Romania would be invited too. There is more than meets the eye, however. What NATO-forever enthusiasts are not saying--perhaps because they refuse to see it--is that the nature and purpose of the Alliance have also started to shift in the aftermath of September 11. When Bill Clinton wanted his war against Serbia he needed NATO to provide the political cover for his decision and the military infrastructure for its execution. Had it not bombed Serbia, he declared in May 1999, "NATO itself would have been discredited for failing to defend the very values that give it meaning." The essence of the Clinton Doctrine was the claim that NATO was based on "values" rather than its members' mutual security interests; and that it was free to intervene militarily as it deemed fit, even outside its area, in accordance with "the will of the international community." Two and a half years later, in the aftermath of September 11, the Republican national security team made no bones about going it alone. Admittedly, in the confused early days after the attack, the Bush administration invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty--claiming that America was a victim of foreign aggression--and on that basis NATO military and civilian bureaucrats expected to have a key role in planning and executing America's eventual response. This was not to be: President Bush soon had second thoughts, and the United States limited its request to the use of its allies' air space, ports and bases, and for the transfer of a few ships to the eastern Mediterranean. It has also asked for five of NATO ground surveillance aircraft to patrol the eastern seaboard of the United States, to release American planes for Asia. Obviously Washington wanted to avoid using NATO equipment in the war zone, which would complicate its chain of command. NATO HQ at Brussels and Mons were left all dressed up with nowhere to go. The decision to invoke Article 5 of the Treaty has only served to underline NATO's marginal role in the current "war against terrorism." In addition to America's unwillingness to take NATO seriously as a means of collective defense against threats to its national security it has also revealed Article 5 as a much looser commitment than had been commonly assumed. It calls on members to "assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force"--but leaves to individual members to decide what those actions might be. NATO officials stress that invoking Article 5 imposes "a huge moral obligation on each member to provide what the US asks for," but the exact magnitude of that obligation remains moot. (Only Great Britain's Tony Blair eagerly took this to mean total political and military commitment with no questions asked, but that does not matter anyway.) A relatively peripheral consequence of the attacks is that the former Yugoslavia is moving rapidly down the list of the Administration's priorities, but this will have a profound effect on the future of NATO. Europe already provides three quarters of NATO forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, and may soon be called upon to take over completely. As a Washington policy analyst asked recently, "One may wonder what is the point of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) if it cannot manage the Balkans." But if the United States expects the European Union to take over the policing of its own back yard, yet intends to run serious wars on its own, what military role remains for NATO? None, if all goes well: if the ESDP comes of age NATO's military role will simply wither away, squeezed as it were between open American unilateralism and growing European local self-sufficiency. This is a good thing: Prior to September 11 NATO was an unnecessary and disruptive relic of the Cold War deeply tainted by criminality. It may evolve into a relatively harmless and even occasionally useful talking shop if it is redefined as a political rather than military organization, dedicated to fighting terrorism, rather than joining "humanitarian" aggressions against undefended small nations or plotting a war against Russia. Russia's President Vladimir Putin has spotted the significance of this shift, and has shrewdly remarked on his recent visit to Brussels that "if NATO takes on a different shade and becomes a political organization" Russia would rethink its opposition to its enlargement. Putin's pitch stems from his realization that Russia's cooperativeness was its strongest trump card in the aftermath of September 11. He was the first foreign leader to contact President Bush, promising that Russia would do "whatever is necessary" to help the United States--a gesture that was much appreciated in Washington, especially in view of the deafening silence from Sr. Fox in Mexico City and uneasy ambivalence among America's "allies" in the Islamic world. Ten days later Putin authorized American aircraft to fly over Russian territory in pursuit of "humanitarian and support missions" in Central Asia. He also promised help with search and rescue missions in Afghanistan if needed. His influence with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia facilitated their decision to allow U.S. forces to use their bases. He then went to a triumphant visit to Germany during which, when asked about the possibility of Russian membership in NATO, he replied that "there is no longer a reason for the West not to conduct such talks." His host, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, echoed his earlier statement that Russian membership could not be ruled out in the long term and that "Germany would be the last country to have something against that." Professional Russophobes in Washington and in the U.S. embassy in Moscow don't like any of this. They are bound to go on repeating their mantra, but Russia's cooperativeness is making it difficult to do so and yet be taken seriously. They see that the friendlier and cuddlier the Russian bear appears--especially compared to the deadly abyss of the Islamic threat--the less likely it is that NATO will retain any meaning at all. Its increasingly political character has implications for its future enlargement: Washington is unconcerned that the arrival of five new members will weaken the alliance's military cohesion. The British have raised objections, pointing out that the three Baltic republics would be hard to defend; but nobody seems to have told the British government that NATO is no longer viewed as a serious military organization over here. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the stated rationale for NATO's existence had finally disappeared. Yet instead of proclaiming victory and disbanding it, the ruling duopoly in Washington has invented a new mission for NATO: that of the self-appointed promoter of democracy, protector of human rights, and guardian against instability. Prior to September 11, extending NATO into Eastern Europe posed a real and present threat to Russia, and threatened to indefinitely perpetuate the division of the continent that was supposed to have been lifted a decade ago. But major events have unintended consequences. In the aftermath of last month's terrorist attacks NATO will grow less relevant and therefore less dangerous. Instead of pandering to the former Soviet satellites' insecurity the United States should prove more willing to encourage them to comprehend that now we all need a Russian economic revival--focused on its links with Europe and a strategic understanding with America--based on the underlying common interest of all three is to keep Islamic marauders at bay. We may all end up safer, and better aware of our real interests, than ever before. Copyright 2001, www.ChroniclesMagazine.org 928 N. Main St., Rockford, IL 6110 THE END ==^================================================================ EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?bUrHhl.bVKZIr Or send an email To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] This email was sent to: [email protected] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
