In line, I hope answering the questions.
Yours,
Joel
On 8/17/16 5:35 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: Discuss
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DISCUSS:
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Thanks for your work on this draft. There may be some overlap in points,
I tried to minimize them...
----
Section 3.1:
I don't see any actual requirements for mutual authentication in this
section, just requirements for identifiers. Did I miss something?
The second bullet in section 3.1 (Mutual Authentication) is about
mutually authenticating. The verbiage was chosen by the more
security-experienced writer, so the co-authors assumed it was
sufficient. If you can suggest better words, we are happy to change it.
Are all mutual auth schemes in scope? Are there any considerations for
mutual authentication (passwords, keys, etc.)?
I2RS does not have any constraints that we know of on the mutual
authentication scheme used. The I2RS protocol may have some constraints
or assumptions, but this document does not place any such.
----
I share the same concern as others for secure transport, but since there
are already discusses on that, I have one comment to add to the existing
discusses below.
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COMMENT:
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Section 3:
Can you clarify the second to last sentence? Do you mean there are
sections that indicate an insecure transport should be used?
I2RS allows the use of an
insecure transport for portions of data models that clearly indicate
insecure transport.
Perhaps:
I2RS allows the use of an
insecure transport for portions of data models that clearly indicate
the use of an
insecure transport.
The ephemeral state document has wording that has been worked out
carefully on how much we are mandating about the specificity of allowing
non-secure transport. Since this document points there, how specific do
we need to be here? (And do folks think that needs to be considered a
normative reference? We can do that if needed.)
----
Section 3.2
I agree with Alissa's discuss point on the following sentence (that could
also be reworded a bit):
A non-secure transport can be can be used for publishing telemetry
data or other operational state that was specifically indicated to
non-confidential in the data model in the Yang syntax.
----
Section 3.4: In the following text:
SEC-REQ-15: The integrity that the message data is not repeated means
that I2RS client to I2RS agent transport SHOULD protect against
replay attack
I'm not sure why this just doesn't say:
SEC-REQ-15: I2RS client to I2RS agent transport SHOULD protect
against
replay attack
The additional text doesn't add anything and sounds a bit confusing.
As per Ben's comments, I think this will get cleaned up. As you
observe, it is overly verbose at the moment.
----
Nit:
I'm not sure these definitions add any value as they seem to restate the
term defined:
I2RS protocol data integrity
The transfer of data via the I2RS protocol has the property of
data integrity described in [RFC4949].
I2RS component protocols
Protocols which are combined to create the I2RS protocol.
-----
I also agree that the definitions from 4949 should be removed.
Thank you in advance.
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