> 
   ADB

   Pak Machmud itu
nulis dipublikasi apa ?
   Sebaiknya komentar Anda
dikirimkan kesana agar berimbang , atau apa
   sudah ?

   Si-Abah

  
_____________________________________________________________________

   Pakde ADB, 
> 
> Yang saya lihat dari
moral ceritanya pak Machmud itu sebenarnya adalah: 
> jangan buruk
muka cermin dibelah. Kita itu senang sekali mengubah-ubah 
>
aturan (yang kadang sifatnya situasional). Padahal kita tahu semua yang

> menjadi masalah bukan aturannya tapi pelaksanaanya. Kalau para
kumpeni ini 
> masih bisa nyolong, ya pinter-pinternya
dia....namanya juga usaha. Tinggal 
> bagaimana saja BP Migas (dan
tentunya kita sebagai orang Indonesia) untuk 
> ikut mengawasinya.
Toh cost recovery hanya dan hanya bisa dilakukan kalau 
> ada
AFE-nya. 
> 
> Jadi kalaupun aturannya diubah, aku kok gak
yakin itu akan berpengaruh 
> selama perilakunya tidak ada
perubahan. 
> 
> 
> 
> salam, 
>

> ----- Original Message ---- 
> 
From: Andang
Bachtiar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 
> To: [email protected]

> Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2007 10:27:16 PM 
>
Subject: Re: [iagi-net-l] Lagi Lagi Cost Recovery: Perlu Reformasi ?? 
> 
> 
> With all due respect to Mr Machmud, I would
like to comment on slight 
> inaccuracy of data (and
interpretation) that he mentioned in his opinion 
> regarding PSC
Contract and Cost Recovery, as follows: 
> 
> 1. There was
no such a unilateral change of PSC contract, because - 
> legally
- the changes in contract in the form of amandement were agreed 
>
upon 
> and signed by both parties, i.e.: Pertamina and the
Contractor. The 
> "offset" 
> mentioned in the
writing also indicated that the changes were through 
> lengthy
consideration and negotiation between parties, so that "the
lost" 
> incurred by the PSC due to the reduced split portion
could be "balanced" 
> by 
> the 100% ceiling of
cost-recovery. 
> 
> 2. What is perceived as a
"standstill exploration & development" during 
>
1977 
> and 1978 was in fact had been the trend since 1971 thru
1975 in the form 
> of 
> numbers of contract signed,
which averaged 3 contract/year (3 in 1971, 2 
> in 
>
1972, 4 in 1973, 1 in 1974, 5 in 1975). In 1977: 2 contracts were signed,

> and in 1978: 4 contracts were signed. So, average during those
2 years 
> mentioned by the article was 3 contract/year similar to
the previous 5 
> year 
> contract rate. It was too
tendensious to blame the new terms of PSC for 
> the 
>
continuing stand-still trend of E&P which already in the trend for the

> previous 5 years. 
> 
> 3. On the
"sanctity-of-contract" issue, my comment is: IF the
"sacred" 
> Undang-Undang Dasar 45 can be ammended (and
it was already), WHY should we 
> always insist to stick on the
PSC contract, which level of sanctity is 
> less 
> then
the UUD?? As long as the changes were properly negotiated and on 
> mutual-benefit spirit, I think we can always try to offer some
changes on 
> that, especially if external condition dictates (the
soaring-up or 
> plummeting-down of oil prices, international
political instability such as 
> wars, etc). Moreover, if the PSC
concerned that their business were 
> severely 
> damaged
by the changes they could have always brought Pertamina to 
>
international arbitration body as mentioned in the Contract, which they

> did 
> not do in this case (but they did it in other
cases: KARAHA BODAS). 
> 
> 4. The article described the
FTP (First Trench Petroleum) in the late 80's 
> (August 1988 to
be exact) as a levy which comes "off the top" which goes 
> to 
> the government before the cost recovery and
production split. In fact it 
> was 
> not only went to
the government but ALSO SHARED BY THE CONTRACTOR 
> according 
> to their split portion (15% of the 20% FTP = 3% of production
revenue went 
> right away to the contractor). And it remained
like that until 2003, when 
> the FTP -again- was changed JUST FOR
NEW CONTRACTS to become 10% which all 
> goes to Government. 
> 
> 5. The argument raised that the cost recovery does not
need fixing because 
> it has existed for 40 years and accepted
and understood by all players is 
> slightly
"unilaterally" judged. First of all, the definition of
"players" 
> seems to be very narrow, especially if we
refer to the political situation 
> within the last 8 years
(reformation era) or 6 years (regional otonomy 
> era). 
>
With the new democratization spirit, which brings up the need of 
> transparency in all sectors including regulation-business in
oil&gas, the 
> "players" of oil & gas has been
including at least: DPR (representing the 
> people of Indonesia)
and also local governments (because they have now 
> shares of
revenues from oil&gas directly). Whether we like it or not, 
>
these 
> "other players" needs to be considered (and
educated) in oil & gas 
> businesses. If they thought that the
cost-recovery scheme was not proper 
> to 
> be applied
because of their lack of experiences in the businesses & 
>
regulation (which have been there for 40 years), we cannot just say that:

> ""NO, guys... we are doing OK, government is doing
OK,.. nothing's wrong 
> with Cost Recovery because both we (PSC)
and Government already accepted 
> and 
> understood it.
So, dont interfere,.... Lets just do business as usual..." 
>
We 
> have to explain to them with numbers, values, and REAL
BENEFITS that they 
> (the peoples) can get by allowing our 40
years Cost-Recovery scheme 
> continue 
> remain as it
was. 
> 
> 6. In contrary to the popular belief of the
investors that the worst flaw 
> of 
> the Cost-Recovery
is it's over-controlled, the belief of the professionals 
>
working directly in oil&gas bussiness in Indonesia is that the 
> Cost-Recovery 
> is loosely-controlled (referred to:
discussions in mail-list groups like 
> KMI, IAGINET,...). 
> 
> Best Regards 
> 
> Andang Bachtiar 
> Exploration Think Tank Indonesia 
> 
> 
>> recovery does not need fixing. It has existed for 40 years and
is 
>> accepted and understood by all players. It is a workable
system, and 
>> no serious objections have ever been raised to
it. Only in the last 
>> few years has pressure mounted,
demanding increased control 
> 
> 
> -----
Original Message ----- 
> 
From: "Rovicky Dwi
Putrohari" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 
> To:
<[email protected]> 
> Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2007
3:35 PM 
> Subject: Re: [iagi-net-l] Lagi Lagi Cost Recovery:
Perlu Reformasi ?? 
> 
> 
>> Oil industry cost
recovery -- don't fix what's not broken 
>> 
>>
Opinion and Editorial - January 08, 2007 
>> 
>>
T.N. Machmud, Jakarta 
>> 
>> There have been
reports in newspapers and professional magazines such 
>> as
Petrominer that the government is planning to issue a set of new 
>> regulations on the oil and gas industry dealing with cost
recovery, 
>> among other issues. 
>> 
>>
Although the proposed regulations are undoubtedly well-intended, past 
>> experience has taught us to leave well enough alone. 
>> 
>> Cost recovery is dealt with in the Production
Sharing Contract (PSC). 
>> An attachment called Exhibit C
determines how and when costs may be 
>> recovered. This system
has been in place and workable since 1967. 
>> 
>> A
change was made in 1977 due to the perception that oil companies 
>> were making a windfall. Oil prices had increased sharply as a
result 
>> of the Middle East embargo and the Iran situation.
The government 
>> argued that it should benefit from the
windfall more than the 
>> companies. 
>> 
>> Hence the production split, after cost recovery, was
unilaterally 
>> changed from 65/35 to 85/15 in favor of state
oil and gas company 
>> Pertamina. As an offset, the companies
were allowed to use all of 
>> their production to recover
their costs, as opposed to the previous 40 
>> percent
cost-recovery ceiling. 
>> 
>> This unilateral
change caused a shock wave through the industry and 
>> brought
exploration and development to a standstill throughout 1977 
>>
and 1978. 
>> 
>> There are lessons learned here
which seem to have been forgotten. One 
>> lesson is that,
because the sanctity of the contract was violated, 
>>
Indonesia's image suffered a severe setback. Likewise, the oil and gas 
>> industry suffered a setback. 
>> 
>> We
got lucky, however, because oil prices continued to rise steadily 
>> in the late 1970s, which made the economics of the revised
contract 
>> workable, and by end of 1978 both exploration and
development had 
>> resumed. 
>> 
>> Oil
prices are cyclical in nature, so guess what happened next? You're 
>> right: Oil prices took a nose dive in the 80s and by 1986
reached an 
>> all-time low of US$9 per barrel! Can you imagine
the pain? At that 
>> price level it took forever for a company
to recover its costs. In all 
>> new fields, the government had
to wait for a long time for its revenue 
>> share, because of
that 1977 cost recovery mechanism. 
>> 
>> As a
result, in the late 1980s, the government changed the rules 
>>
unilaterally again, this time adopting something it called First 
>> Tranche Petroleum (FTP), which is simply a royalty. It is a
levy which 
>> comes "off the top" which goes to the
government before the cost 
>> recovery and production split.
It is currently set at 10 percent to 15 
>> percent of
production. Why not just call it a royalty? That term was 
>>
passed over because in certain quarters it smacked of the old colonial 
>> concession system. 
>> 
>> This ignored
the fact that Malaysia had applied a 10 percent royalty 
>>
from the outset, so that both its federal government and state 
>> governments receive an early cut from any production. This is
why 
>> there have been few complaints from the states in
Malaysia about how 
>> the pie gets divided. 
>> 
>> Thanks to the royalty -- excuse me, thanks to FTP, our
government is 
>> now guaranteed a share of production
"off the top" while cost recovery 
>> is going on,
which greatly helps the government in a low-price 
>> scenario.
This seems unlikely now given the current high-price 
>>
environment, but it is still a possibility worth considering. Again, 
>> while it was well intended, the introduction of the FTP
constituted 
>> another unilaterally imposed change in PSC
terms. 
>> 
>> Back to our favorite subject, cost
recovery. If past lessons are any 
>> example we should be very
careful in making yet another change in PSC 
>> terms. Such
changes may very well conflict with the existing PSC and 
>>
cause the net economic impact of the PSC on the investor to further 
>> deteriorate. 
>> 
>> Before signing the
PSC (or KKS as it is now called), the investor 
>> built an
economic model, calculating his return on investment using 
>>
several scenarios. He negotiated a contract expecting a certain 
>> minimum net result. If this expected net result no longer holds
true 
>> because the deal was unilaterally changed, or if he
is, for example, 
>> subject to sudden spurious tax levies at
the central and local levels, 
>> he will demand that his
economic expectations under the agreed 
>> contract be
restored. If he does not get that, he may pack his bags 
>> and
leave, and/or resort to arbitration. 
>> 
>>
Admittedly, there will always be a need for some degree of regulation, 
>> especially in the event of what economists call market
failures. But 
>> the government should step in only when it
needs to fix something. As 
>> the saying goes, if it ain't
broke, don't fix it. That is the 
>> prevailing management
theory and a fundamental credo of 
>> microeconomics. 
>> 
>> The bottom line here is that, contrary to
popular belief, cost 
>> recovery does not need fixing. It has
existed for 40 years and is 
>> accepted and understood by all
players. It is a workable system, and 
>> no serious objections
have ever been raised to it. Only in the last 
>> few years has
pressure mounted, demanding increased control. 
>> 
>> It is not perfect. Nothing is. But it is the best we have. If
you ask 
>> the investors about flaws, they will tell you its
worst flaw is that 
>> is already over-controlled. Therefore,
the most we should do is a 
>> little fine-tuning after
consultation with our investors. 
>> 
>> Petrominer,
it its most recent issue, provided an excellent overview 
>>
about why cost appears to be high while production is going down. Any 
>> oil and gas person can tell you that when you are faced with
aging 
>> fields (like in Indonesia) your maintenance cost goes
up. When you 
>> couple that with decreasing production, your
cost per barrel goes up 
>> (like in Indonesia). 
>>

>> In addition, the cost of goods and services worldwide is
increasing. 
>> It is ridiculous to say that if production goes
down, cost must also 
>> go down. More often it is the other
way around. 
>> 
>> We hasten to say that the
Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) has every right 
>> to look into
cost. For that matter, the Development Finance 
>> Comptroller
and Upstream Oil and Gas Regulating Agency have that 
>> right,
and it is exercised frequently. 
>> 
>> BPK has
legitimate questions which deserve legitimate answers. Those 
>> answers will be duly provided. Certain individuals have even

>> suggested, irresponsibly, that the law enforcement agencies
should be 
>> brought in. But that suggestion seems to be
politically motivated. 
>> 
>> My feeling is that
the companies' books will tell their own story. 
>> Cost is
what it is. In a way it could even be good news when costs go 
>> up. It could mean that the companies are spending more money on

>> exploration and development, finding new production, at
which point 
>> costs become recoverable. We cannot achieve the
higher production 
>> target of 1.3 million barrels per day by
2009 by holding cost down at 
>> an artificially low level,
which seems to be what we are hearing. We 
>> may have heard
wrong, we hope. 
>> 
>> Hopefully, when everybody
has had his say, the oil and gas industry 
>> can go back to
work and concentrate on what it does: explore and 
>> develop.
This is, after all, what the country needs most. We need to 
>>
create space for them to do so, and not endlessly interfere with 
>> spurious accusations and still more regulations. Let us learn
from 
>> history not to fix something that isn't broken. 
>> 
>> The writer is former President and CEO of ARCO
Indonesia. He is a 
>> lawyer and an observer of the oil and
gas industry who teaches in 
>> several leading business
schools. 
> 
>
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> siap melancong dan presentasi di Bali pada tahun 2007 ini??? 
> ayo bersiap untuk PIT Bersama HAGI-IAGI dan asosiasi2 lainnya di
Pulau 
> Dewata!!! 
> semarakkan dengan makalah-makalah
yang berkualitas internasional... 
>
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