In <[email protected]>, on
04/28/2010
at 10:44 PM, Tony Harminc <[email protected]> said:
>MVT had no system integrity or security at all. Password "security" was
>trivially bypassed,
Only by those who knew how to get into key 0. If you neglect to protect
PASSWORD, that's you fault, not MVT's.
>There was no fetch protection for all that real storage,
Security by obscurity was never a good idea.
>One day, one of those undergrads who we would today call a script
>kiddy, ran an IEHPROGM SCRATCH VTOC on all the packs whose names
>he could figure out.
That tells me more about the staff than about MVT. It wouldn't have caused
any damage at my shop, even on the PCP systems.
>Do you remember TCAM...?
ITYM QTAM. Thanks for the memories :-(
>CRJE...?
CRBE. ITF.
>HASP-II
You think MFT 2 and HASP II were bad? The original MFT and HASP were
worse.
>It is indeed fun to play with on an emulator in 2010, but to say it
>wasn't broken...
Oh, it was seriously broken, but to blame lax administration on MVT is
worse than claiming that MVT wasn't broken.
--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz, SysProg and JOAT
ISO position; see <http://patriot.net/~shmuel/resume/brief.html>
We don't care. We don't have to care, we're Congress.
(S877: The Shut up and Eat Your spam act of 2003)
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