[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That reminds me. The first ATMs in Canada I saw at my bank were made by
IBM - and they used a formed-character printer to print the information
about the transaction on card stock media.
It was apparent to me that what they were using was exactly the right
size to be a 96-column card.
ref (including past posts mentioning los gatos lab atm machine development):
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006x.html#9 Plurals and language confusion
ditto the san jose ibm credit union
offices were in the basement of bldg.12 ... they had to move out when bldg.12
under went
seismic retrofit.
and for the heck of it and more topic drift, other posts in the pin attack
threads
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006u.html#42 New attacks on the financial PIN
processing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006u.html#43 New attacks on the financial PIN
processing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006u.html#47 New attacks on the financial PIN
processing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006u.html#48 New attacks on the financial PIN
processing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006v.html#1 New attacks on the financial PIN
processing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006v.html#2 New attacks on the financial PIN
processing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006v.html#33 New attacks on the financial PIN
processing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006v.html#39 On sci.crypt: New attacks on the
financial PIN processing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006v.html#42 On sci.crypt: New attacks on the
financial PIN processing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006v.html#46 Patent buster for a method that
increases password security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006v.html#49 Patent buster for a method that
increases password security
the original post in the thread
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006u.html#40 New attacks on the financial PIN
processing
was oriented towards insiders being able to take advantage of their position to
compromise
PIN processing.
this is different than the skimming/harvesting attacks
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#harvest
that can be done with compromised terminals (which may involve insiders or
outsiders) ... i.e. capture of static authentication data for replay attacks.
traditionally this has involved magstripe cards (with or w/o PINs) ... but has
also been used against chipcards that rely on static authentication data
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006v.html#45 On sci.crypt: New attacks on the
financial PIN processing
in some cases ... some of the chipcard implementations using static
authentication data has made it even more attractive for the attacker doing
skimming exploits.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions,
send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the message: GET IBM-MAIN INFO
Search the archives at http://bama.ua.edu/archives/ibm-main.html
