-----Original Message-----
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of Jeffrey Deaver
Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 5:17 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: LPAR Org & Security

<SNIP>

We systems engineers are, of course, arguing that we need that access as
a
matter of productivity.   It really opens a can of worms, since if they
were to dictate that, we would soon be arguing that all the development
and
test servers should also only be on the NEQAL network.  And then we get
into the arguments about where the production instances of DB2 verses
the 3
test instances should be running.  Separate LPARS?  Ug.

<SNIP>

What is the cost of fully splitting the two networks and workloads?

Part of that cost will be the building of a limited interface for
production control to promote test source to production (I assume that
this is done now in your shop). This limited interface may be a set
number of DASD volumes that only production control can write to (from
the test side), but which the production system reads for application
software load libraries and storage of the production copy of source.
Or, the copying of load members (and such) to tape and then loading from
tape (would this require a different bank of tape drives in a different
room -- don't laugh a certain USGov't installation where I've worked did
exactly this).

Next will be the cost of maintaining the two systems. Since you can't
log in to the other LPAR, you probably can't access the other LPAR's
DASD (other than for the exception above). This means that you will have
to either have two PCs on your desk, or you will have to have two
offices. Or you will have to have some other means to access each system
in such a way that you won't accidentally make some change that should
have been to/with the other system.

This will also necessitate dual security data bases...

So how far should one go in doing the splitting?

And is management willing to give up the ability to fix the other system
when it crashes and can't be IPLed? After all, a second LPAR that can
touch the first LPAR is the first line of defense in disaster recovery
(that assumes the computer room is otherwise functional, the CEC is
otherwise functional, etc.).

Regards,
Steve Thompson

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