While it is true that many might not care about someone corrupting a user key CSA area (even if it potentially compromises their system), that is not the only integrity exposure that user key CSA can result in.
Allowing unauthorized communication between address spaces (i.e., "covert channels") is also made possible by this. By the way much of TSO/E is written to expect Key 8 callers. It always has been. If it was simply a question of changing one module to return in the key of the caller instead of the "known" key. So this is not necessarily a question of getting back in an unexpected state, it is also a question of not meeting the input requirements for a service.. If it were nicer, the service would have simply returned or abended. Instead it trusted its caller to have met those requirements. Are they documented? I have no idea. Peter Relson z/OS Core Technology Design ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the message: GET IBM-MAIN INFO Search the archives at http://bama.ua.edu/archives/ibm-main.html
