> Put another way: this is arguably a fundamental design flaw in OS/360 I remember well the early days of OS/360. There was no concept of the insider threat. We were all in this together, and we were all good guys. Maybe one or two of the application folks were suspect <g> but the sysprogs were certainly all good guys, and the application folks didn't know about this control block stuff.
There was of course no online access, so threats were largely contained by the lock on the computer room door. Charles -----Original Message----- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Phil Smith III Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2022 11:39 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Marx Zelden - IPLINFO utility This is a pointless discussion. Protecting this storage will break myriad programs, and adding a subsystem or service to provide controlled access would be a huge undertaking, both for IBM to implement and for customers and ISVs to use. I would predict that even if IBM did it, people would turn it off so they could get work done. (Think early days of Windows UAC-and yes, that got better, but with significant investment in/revamp of Windows, plus it's mostly transparent to programs. Not the same thing, just similar in that folks just turned it off because it was too intrusive.) Put another way: this is arguably a fundamental design flaw in OS/360. At this point, it's not fixable. ...phsiii P.S. There's gotta be a joke about "Marx" Zelden and universal access to low core in there somewhere! ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
