John McKown wrote: >There are _NO_ connections to z/OS even from internal boxes. When files >need to be transferred, they are written from z/OS to the appropriate, >internal, FTP server.
So there are no connections, but there are connections. With bulk transfers of personal healthcare data with no granular security context preserved, I assume. As Mr. Spock used to say, "Fascinating." The modern (and not so modern) reality is that "internal" networks are being penetrated all the time, and "internal" servers (and other devices) are getting pwned all the time. "Maginot Line" approaches no longer work, if they ever did. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maginot_Line Defense in depth is really, really important. This isn't the time for complacency, I'm afraid. Yes, I'm aware that there are some individuals in management who, on occasion, act like Frank Drebin: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdFl__NlOpA It's still important to explain the risks and document them. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Timothy Sipples IT Architect Executive, Industry Solutions, IBM z Systems, AP/GCG/MEA E-Mail: [email protected] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
