The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (teep) WG in the Security Area of the IETF is undergoing rechartering. The IESG has not made any determination yet. The following draft charter was submitted, and is provided for informational purposes only. Please send your comments to the IESG mailing list (i...@ietf.org) by 2018-03-05.
Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (teep) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Current status: BOF WG Chairs: Nancy Cam-Winget <ncamw...@cisco.com> Dave Thaler <dtha...@microsoft.com> Assigned Area Director: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> Security Area Directors: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> Mailing list: Address: t...@ietf.org To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/teep Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/teep/ Group page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/teep/ Charter: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-teep/ The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a secure area of a processor. The TEE provides security features such as isolated execution and integrity of Trusted Applications, along with provisions for maintaining the confidentiality of their assets. In general terms, the TEE offers an execution space that provides a higher level of security than a "rich" operating system and more functionality than a secure element. For example, implementations of the TEE concept have been developed by ARM, and Intel using the TrustZone and the SGX technology, respectively. To programmatically install, update, and delete applications in a TEE, the Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning protocol runs between a service within the TEE on a given device, a relay application or service access point on the device's network stack and a server-side infrastructure that interacts with and optionally maintains the applications. Some tasks are security sensitive and the server side requires information about the device characteristics in the form of attestation and the device-side may require information about the server. Privacy considerations have to be taken into account with authentication features and attestation. This working group aims to develop an application layer protocol providing TEEs providing lifecycle management and security domain management for trusted applications. A security domain allows a service provider's applications to be isolated so that one security domain cannot be influenced by another domain, unless the domain exposes an API to allow inter-domain interactions. The solution approach must take a wide range of TEE and relevant technologies into account and will focus on the use of public key cryptography. The group will produce the following deliverables. The first draft is an architecture document describing the involved entities, their relationships, assumptions, the keying framework and relevant use cases. Second, a solution document that describes the above-described functionality that will be developed. The choice of encoding format(s) will be decided in the working group. The group may document several attestation technologies considering the different hardware capabilities, performance, privacy, and operational properties. The group will maintain a close relationship with the IETF SUIT working group, GlobalPlatform, Trusted Computing Group, and other relevant standards to ensure interoperability, compatibility, and proper use of existing TEE-relevant application layer interfaces. Milestones: Mar 2018 - Adopt an Architecture document Mar 2018 - Adopt a solution document Aug 2018 - Progress Solution document to the IESG for publication Dec 2018 - Begin WGLC for Architecture document Jan 2019 - Progress Architecture document to the IESG for publication Jul 2019 - Begin WGLC for Solution document