The IESG has received a request from the SIDR Operations WG (sidrops) to consider the following document: - 'BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export' <draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01.txt> as Proposed Standard
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the [email protected] mailing lists by 2020-03-18. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to [email protected] instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route, which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress/ IESG discussion can be tracked via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress/ballot/ No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. _______________________________________________ IETF-Announce mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
