The IESG has received a request from the SIDR Operations WG (sidrops) to consider the following document: - 'The Use of maxLength in the RPKI' <draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-11.txt> as Best Current Practice
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the [email protected] mailing lists by 2022-07-20. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to [email protected] instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract This document recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin hijack attack surface by prudently limiting the set of IP prefixes that are included in a Route Origin Authorization (ROA). One recommendation is to avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases. The recommendations complement and extend those in RFC 7115. The document also discusses the creation of ROAs for facilitating the use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation services. Considerations related to ROAs and origin validation in the context of destination-based Remote Triggered Black Hole (RTBH) filtering are also highlighted. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen/ No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. The document contains these normative downward references. See RFC 3967 for additional information: rfc6811: BGP Prefix Origin Validation (Proposed Standard - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)) rfc6482: A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) (Proposed Standard - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)) rfc4271: A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4) (Draft Standard - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)) _______________________________________________ IETF-Announce mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
