The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'RTP Payload Format for the Secure Communication Interoperability
   Protocol (SCIP) Codec'
  (draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-scip-09.txt) as Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
Working Group.

The IESG contact person is Murray Kucherawy.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-scip/





Technical Summary

This document describes the RTP payload format of the Secure Communication 
Interoperability Protocol (SCIP). SCIP is an application layer protocol that 
defines the establishment of reliable secure end-to-end communications, 
including capabilities exchange with secure session establishment parameters 
such as codec selection, encryption algorithms, security levels, and 
cryptographic initialization values. This document defines the Session 
Description Protocol (SDP) and RTP parameters needed to support SCIP over RTP.

Working Group Summary

The shepherd writuep has some discussion about the content and history, but 
none of it rises to the level of concern.  The WG broadly supports advancement 
of the document.

Document Quality

SCIP over RTP has been implemented and widely deployed in endpoints, such
as communication devices utilized by members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).  One of the motivations for publishing this document
as a Proposed Standard is to address interoperability issues with
Session Border Controllers (SBCs).

No additional reviews beyond the usual ones appear to be warranted.

Personnel

Bernard Aboba is the document shepherd.
Murray Kucherawy is the responsible Area Director.



RFC Editor Note

Please insert the following "IESG Note" at the front of the document prior to 
publication:

This IETF specification depends upon a second technical specification that is 
not available publicly, namely [SCIP210].  The IETF was therefore unable to 
conduct a security review of that specification, independently or when carried 
inside AVT. Implementers need to be aware that the IETF hence cannot verify any 
of the security claims contained in this document.

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