The IESG has received a request from the SIDR Operations WG (sidrops) to consider the following document: - 'Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation States in Transitive BGP Path Attributes' <draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-06.txt> as Best Current Practice
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the [email protected] mailing lists by 2026-05-27. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to [email protected] instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) derived validation states in transitive Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes. Annotating routes with transitive attributes signaling validation states may cause needless flooding of BGP UPDATE messages through the global Internet routing system, for example when Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are issued, or are revoked, or when RPKI-To-Router sessions are terminated. Operators should ensure RPKI-derived validation states are not signaled in transitive BGP Path Attributes. Specifically, Operators should not associate Prefix Origin Validation state with BGP routes using transitive BGP Communities. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp/ No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. _______________________________________________ IETF-Announce mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
