-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
In message <[email protected]>, Vittorio
<[email protected]> writes
>This is the crux and it is worth stating precisely: "content changed
>after signing" and "content changed after signing, maliciously" produce
>the same signal, and a verifier cannot tell them apart from the message
>alone.
this should surprise nobody
>What seems necessary is a way to record that the most recent signature
>failed to verify and to deliver the message anyway
since it would be "local policy" to accept a purported DKIM2 message
which fails verification your local policy could involve writing any
header field you wished ...
... what the DKIM2 spec (that most people here are working on) does not
permit is for you to forward a message accepted by such local policy to
anyone else -- if you did you should expect them to reject it.
>the base specification offers no normative guidance for
>this class of failure - leaving the accept-or-reject decision to
>uncoordinated local policy
if it was coordinated it would not be "local policy"
- --
richard @ highwayman . com "Nothing seems the same
Still you never see the change from day to day
And no-one notices the customs slip away"
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1
iQA/AwUBanivfmHfC/FfW545EQIxMwCeIbUcUFqiGk7HvuAf0Pyob0KQzTUAn014
DnmAR4m47YKgLsInkNHw3JXr
=+S3C
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
_______________________________________________
Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
