-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
In message <[email protected]>, Alexander
Stumpf <[email protected]> writes
>The other side of the equation is the forwarding server. Very often, this is
>not
>operated by a large provider with a dedicated engineering team, but by a
>member
>of the association in their spare time. Regularly applying software/security
>updates is simple, but implementing a new protocol with consequences for the
>deliverability of forwarded mail is quite another.
What software do you think these volunteers are running ? surely it
will be a well-known package and they are running it on a well-known
*nix distribution
If so, why do you think "implementing a new protocol" is more complex
than a security upgrade ?
>I am using German associations merely as a concrete example. The underlying
>issue is broader: there is a very large installed base of independently
>operated, small mail systems, and there is no realistic mechanism by which all
>of them can be upgraded in lockstep.
There is no need for "lockstep" (which is usually termed a "flag day"
around here).
There is a need for upgrade before widespread insistence on DKIM2
authentication being present ... I have reason to believe that
insistence may in fact occur in Germany faster than most places; but I
have no doubt that attention will be paid to what proportion of email is
DKIM2 is signed before any major decisions are implemented ("announced"
being another matter).
>So I strongly support designing the protocol in a way that non-participating
>legacy hops can be encountered during the **transition** without making an
>otherwise valid message undeliverable.
How do you propose to do that ? and which of the aims of this working
group will you ignore as you proceed ?
- --
richard @ highwayman . com "Nothing seems the same
Still you never see the change from day to day
And no-one notices the customs slip away"
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1
iQA/AwUBapNmbGHfC/FfW545EQLR8QCgtYNgFJj+pkCJ/SqTcNBsF0G/LUIAnjh9
x1QuETsBvtcA+DRuWhEZcPmi
=0IQz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
_______________________________________________
Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
