On 21/09/2026 8:50 pm, MCN-IETF wrote:
I've been thinking a little more about the donotmodify discussion, especially Bron's invoice example, and I am starting to wonder whether we may be making this more complicated than necessary. > Perhaps the more fundamental question is: why would a Domain Owner
want an intermediary in transit to be allowed to modify the body of a
message while that message continues to represent the original domain?
Indeed. I too would like to see concrete evidence, backed with real
statistics and hard numbers. Currently, what we have is largely conjecture.
E-mail relayed through marketing services that add tracking links and
beacons is one case where a domain owner may want modifications to
occur, but most such services require configurations that permit them to
sign on behalf of the original domain. If that results in broken
verification, it's either down to the verifier not checking all relevant
keys (where e-mail is pre-signed), or incorrect DNS configuration.
Neither of these represent an actual failure of DKIM.
I don't buy the mailing list argument at all, given correct list
behaviour is clearly defined. If you set that issue aside, then I think
it's perfect reasonable to ask how common modifications are made in
transit, and which, if any, are actually wanted by the sender. Given the
motivation to explicitly identify malicious actors and their changes,
I'd want to see some meaningful quantification of that particular
problem and the role DMARC/SFP plays in their validation.
Regards,
R. Latimer
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