Hello John,
It is my sentence, so let me answer.
No free pass. The wording is bounded to enforcement policy: a receiver
may not reject a message on the ground that its chain begins at i=1.
Content, reputation and local policy are untouched. Your spambot fails
on all of them.
What signing at i=1 means is that the signer takes responsibility for
what it sends. Your bot forges List-Id and signs it, so the forgery is
bound to a domain that is cryptographically accountable for it. A
signature over a false field does not make the field true, it makes the
signer answerable for it. The bot has handed you a name to block rather
than escaped one.
And the absence of a prior chain was never a signal you could have used.
Every message entering DKIM2 for the first time has none: your spambot,
a company sending its own mail, a relay, all of them alike. A condition
shared by good mail and bad cannot serve as a discriminator.
On the forged headers themselves I would only point at what you wrote,
that “there’s nothing new about that either”. That still holds.
Regards,
Vittorio Moccia
Il 2026-10-13 19:39 John Levine ha scritto:
It appears that William Weiner <[email protected]> said:
The general principle as you have stated it - that absence of a prior
chain must not be treated as a negative indicator for an i=1
signature,
whoever produced it - is the right language and I support seeing it in
adopted text.
It sounds like you're saying that if my spambot puts List-Id and the
like in the spam and signs it with i=1 to make it
look like it's reoriginating, it gets a free pass. If that's not what
you're saying, please clarify.
R's,
John
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