Taking a close look at the current DKIM2 I see some opportunities for
simplification.

I am reluctantly willing to take it as given that replay of already
signed messages is a practically significant issue for at least some of
the larger providers, and that this warrants signing their mail with
DKIM2, allowing receiving systems to detect unauthorised replays.

That said, much of the complexity of the design is a result of the
design also attempting to authenticate bounces of messages that
might have been modified in transit.  This major redesign of
the reverse path is, at least for me, a bridge too far.  Is this
absolutely necessary?  The cure looks worse than the disease.

So I'd like to see DKIM2 slimmed down, to just make the minimal
requisite forward-path changes, and leave the reverse path alone.

Secondly, I'd like to suggest that this is not a one-size-fits-all
design.  Its complexity is heavily weighted towards the problems faced
by the largest providers who offer free or low-cost services to all
comers.  Many domains (e.g. my own), have no need to be concerned with
message replays.  I don't host any users who author messages that
an attacker would find profitable to replay.

With that in mind, I'd like to suggest that email systems that have no
need for the additional anti-replay protection be able to opt-out of
that feature set entirely, and should be able to sign just the
message-content, sans envelope, when that meets their needs.  This
substantially reduces complexity, and supports continued delivery of
multi-recipient mail without disclosing Bcc recipients in the message
payload.

I think we can have a more flexible design that still supports the
ostensible real needs of the large providers, without unnecessarily
burdening the entire ecosystem with the same concerns..

-- 
    Viktor.  🇺🇦 Слава Україні!
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