> I think that the realistic goal here is that it should be possible for a > list to be configured to allow a message to survive.
If that's a very important goal, one could certainly set up list software to send messages through as single message digests, with the enclosed message untouched. But I can't say I know many lists where I would want that, and if security of messages were that big a deal, I think I would want to use S/MIME to identify the individual sender and not just the first MTA a message passed through. > It would also be useful to give some guidelines to mailing lists that > are going to mangle messages of ways in which they can do this without > causing grief. We could, but I would be surprised if any authors of list software were interested. At the moment there are approximately a bazillion lists and list management packages, and approximately no DKIM, so I wouldn't hold my breath waiting for them to adapt, particularly since forged messages leaking into lists isn't a significant problem for any list I know. As I keep saying, if a signature happens to survive a trip through a list manager, that's nice, but it's hopeless to try to invent a signature that will survive most or even many list systems, and I don't want the group to waste time trying to invent some hack to do it. Regards, John Levine, [EMAIL PROTECTED], Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies", Information Superhighwayman wanna-be, http://www.johnlevine.com, Mayor "I dropped the toothpaste", said Tom, crestfallenly. _______________________________________________ ietf-dkim mailing list http://dkim.org
