----- Original Message ----- From: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Hector Santos" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> On Sat, 2005-11-05 at 00:38 -0500, Hector Santos wrote: > > > And how do to a VERIFIER or SIGNER get this "exposed expressed desire?" How > > does the VERIFIER and and possibly RESIGNER get this information? > > The opportunistic scheme is rather simple, so I try fewer words. Thanks. I appreciate it. So if its simple, should we expect some have pseudo-code very soon? :-) > As the MDA sees broad-bindings with matching domains, it compiles a list > of these matches. This list could be simply the domain-names. > > this-bank.com > that-bank.com > pay-this.com > pay-that.com > this-store.com > that-store.com > > Perhaps these names are stored in a zone or a database. It does not > matter. No, doug, you didnt' answer the question. Where do you get the "expose expressed desire" that a domain will even want you to sign its messages in the first place? Does the domain have choice in the matter? Even then, it does matter. You have a major threat by avoiding first time inconsistency. With your idea, a system will need more sampling to get a better feel. What if its one phish per system attack spread across a tens of thousands, even a million systems? Are you now going to throw in a RAZOR like concept into every expanding solution pool so that these participant P2P systems can learn from each other? Why not just reject it with a 451 because of the match failure? If its a legitimate SMTP system, his SMTP system is designed to retry. > Your chart should not offer hostile treatment when email-addresses don't > match the signing-domain, unless they are on a list. Doug, the CHART has nothing to do with with a LIST, LEARNING, ANALYSIS, DIAGNOSTICS or BEHAVIOR of domains. The chart simply allows systems to STOP the CRIME before it happens. The chart offers a theoritical 69% (25/36) hard results with zero false positive ACCEPT/REJECT conditions. It has 31% (11/36) states where there is insufficient data to make a hard decision. However, in these cases, there is nothing to prevent a system or implementation to augment a pattern recognition learning concept of repeated failures. Doug, you are totally mis-representing the entire idea of what SSP is suppose to do. I'm sorry, but I can't help but feel you are doing this intentionally. > When they are not on the list, then the reputation of the > signature would simply be evaluated. There you go again, We are back to a DNA concept. Where is the pseudo-code? -- Hector Santos, Santronics Software, Inc. http://www.santronics.com _______________________________________________ ietf-dkim mailing list http://dkim.org
