Douglas Otis wrote:
> dangerous open-ended policies as seen with SPF. (Very bad.)
Define "open-ended": I've no idea what you're talking about,
or rather if it's NEUTRAL you're wrong. And for your favourite
"pure DKIM" I'd like to know what it's good for:
As an example, what exactly could say Ironport do with it ?
Organize senderbase more efficiently, would that be all, or
what else is the purpose of your "pure DKIM" ?
This "pure DKIM" needs some convincing reasons why senders
and receivers should bother to implement it, "helps to create
white lists" isn't good enough from my POV, but probably I
just miss some of your points.
Bye, Frank
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