Arvel, +1
Keep in mind that this is only true (as I see it) when both the policy domain (822.From) and the signing domain are phished. If any one is not phished, then there is some possibility for protection. Do you agree with that logic? As you touch upon in a previous post, if we can make the bad guy stay away from attempting to forged the real domain, that would be a step in the right direction. -- Hector Santos, Santronics Software, Inc. http://www.santronics.com ----- Original Message ----- From: "Arvel Hathcock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 1:49 PM Subject: RE: [ietf-dkim] SSP = FAILURE DETECTION > Major +1 > > -- > Arvel > > -----Original Message----- > From: Michael Thomas > Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 8:58 AM > To: Wietse Venema > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP = FAILURE DETECTION > > Wietse Venema wrote: > >> >> What was the advantage of SSP with look-alike domains? >> >> > To find large unproductive ratholes? Neither DKIM or SSP > claim to have any direct effect on look-alike domain names, > and there's nothing in our charter that says that we'll be > doing anything about that ever. DKIM/SSP are two pieces for > a much larger set of things that need to come together > to combat phishing including software layered on top of > thse base authentication mechanisms, user base training/human > factors, and law enforcement -- most of which will not have > any IETF involvement at all. No amount of hand-wringing > here is likely to tell us how this will ultimately play out. _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
