On Sep 20, 2006, at 4:23 PM, Tim Draegen wrote:
- My largest customers will not deploy DKIM verification if it
requires making a DNS query (or two) for every single non-signed
email that they receive. Even if it makes no real-world
difference,
some people just won't do it.
You might add non-cached DNS queries.
1. Intro
- "In the absence of a valid DKIM signature on behalf of the "From"
address [RFC2822], the verifier of a message MUST determine
whether
messages from that sender are expected to be signed, and what
signatures are acceptable."
MUST --> MAY. In reality, my customers won't do this for every
email they receive. They'll want to control this behavior, for
whatever reason.
Agreed.
- "Without such a mechanism ... unsigned messages will always
need to
be considered to be potentially legitimate."
I believe there is quite a bit of existing technology in place to
determine what is legitimate, regardless of signed status. :->
SSP as-a-way-to determine the validity of unsigned email seems a
bit misguided.
Agreed.
This effort is also possibly pointless when look-alike attacks are
considered.
- "Expressions of signing practice which require outside auditing
are
out of scope for this specification because they fall under the
purview of reputation and accreditation."
SSP makes no sense to me unless I view it through a 'reputation'
lense. Without going out of scope, I'm hoping SSP describes how
either a DKIM-verifier or a reputation-agent can determine a
domain's signing policy.
Agreed.
Here reputation must be viewed as something not defined in a classic
sense of avoiding spam, but rather what might be considered
"trustworthy" from the basis of transactional messages. The
important aspect needed for discerning what is "trustworthy" might be
partially covered by section 4.5. In other words, one MUST NOT
assume an entire domain is "trustworthy" and this is where policy can
help.
-Doug
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