My Technical opinion. This 6.3 provision #11 makes no sense to me.
>From a design standpoint, the better system is probably going to end up looking up all domains because that will guaranteed a consistent security check. The only reason I see this provision exist, nothing to do with logic, but something to satisfy backward compatibility with existing alpha code being used. I see no logic in trying to dictate on a designer how he/she is going to implement DKIM and SSP and that is what this provision attempts to do. Imagine if you remove it? What is lost? The only legitimate argument can make is that it is an OPTIMIZER, an optimizer purely based on the presumption that a VALID 1st party signature is always correct. Well, as you said the inevitable will happen, when the crypto is hacked, you now will have millions of vulnerable sites simply because they follow this illogical provision that serves no place in a requirements document but to satisfy alpha code implementations that no one should be basing their future on anyway. That's my opinion and I'll leave it at that. Thanks --- HLS ----- Original Message ----- From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 2:30 PM Subject: [ietf-dkim] Secrtion 6.3 Comments ondraft-ietf-dkim-ssp-requirements-02.txt 6.3 11. The Protocol MUST NOT be required to be invoked if a valid first party signature is found. Should be: The Protocol MUST NOT be required to be invoked if a valid first party signature that satisfies the cryptographic criteria of the recipient is found. If I look at the email and find a satisfactory signature I am done. If I don't find any signature at all *or I find only a weak signature* I need to look at the policy. Otherwise the requirements of 5.7 are unmet. This requirement only starts to have real effect when we have a serious enough compromise of SHA or RSA1024 to mean that verifiers would reject weak signatures. I don't expect to get there until 2015 but I do expect to get there eventually. Also I would like to reword 12: [PROVISIONAL] A domain holder MUST be able to publish a Practice which enumerates the acceptable cryptographic algorithms for signatures purportedly from that domain. To be 12a [PROVISIONAL] A domain holder MUST be able to publish a Practice which specifies the acceptable application of cryptographic algorithms for signatures purportedly from that domain. 12b [PROVISIONAL] A domain holder MUST be able to publish a Practice which specifies the application of multiple signatures with different cryptographic algorithms for messages purportedly from that domain. The difference here is key to the distinction between my proposal and the existing one. A mere enumeration of the acceptable algorithms does not allow the upgrade/downgrade attack to be effectively defeated. Merely saying 'I support SHA-256' does not in fact strengthen the policy. Also the term 'enumeration' expresses the assumption that the algorithms will be listed in the policy record. I don't think they should go there. The proper place for them is in the key record. This avoids the need to duplicate the information and is in any case necessary to meet requirement 11 which can only be met if the key records effectively enumerate the set of acceptable algorithms. _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
