On Mar 3, 2008, at 6:35 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
> On Mar 3, 2008, at 4:54 PM, Jim Fenton wrote:
>> Douglas Otis wrote:
>>
>> You have proposed that domains publishing ASP records be required  
>> to publish MX records.  But in this case, we have a domain (or  
>> perhaps a host) that has not published an ASP record, so there  
>> could be no requirement for an MX.
>
> Requiring MX records be coupled with DKIM/SMTP policy records means  
> "existing" domains without MX and policy records thereby indicate  
> they do not have policy asserted for the domain.  Importantly, this  
> result can be reached without climbing the domain tree.  Conversely,  
> when a policy record is discovered without an MX record, checks  
> against parent domains are also prevented.  Both of these important  
> safety features are missing from the present DKIM policy discovery  
> algorithm.

>>> But avoiding a policy check at the parent would be in scope, would  
>>> it not?
>>
>> Perhaps, if there were a clear advantage to checking for the  
>> existence of the domain vs. querying the parent, which I explore in  
>> the following paragraph.
>
> Second or third level domains might be above millions of email- 
> address domains which could cause DKIM policy discovery processes to  
> be invoked.  An algorithm that makes requests for non-existent  
> records within parent domains will generate a fair amount of new and  
> highly distributed overhead of non-beneficial traffic that will  
> cause unnecessary processing delays.
>
>>>> Another justification might be caching, but I'd need to find out  
>>>> more about how negative caching works: would a negative response  
>>>> to _asp._domainkey.nonexistent.example.com result in a negative  
>>>> cache entry for nonexistent.example.com?  If so, step 2 might  
>>>> occur very quickly (and locally), potentially eliminating the  
>>>> step 3 query for the parent, which would probably not be cached.
>>>
>>> See RFC 2308.  Negative caching is not as certain as positive  
>>> caching.  This is why the MX record should be checked prior to  
>>> walking up the domain tree.  Negative caching should be retrained  
>>> as long as the MINIMUM field of the SOA record or the TTL of the  
>>> SOA itself, whichever is less.  Not all resolvers are RFC 2308  
>>> compliant.  Some truncate the duration of negative caching to  
>>> limit the effects of transient network failures.
>>
>> In this case, the query that would benefit from negative caching  
>> occurs immediately (within milliseconds) of the first query, so  
>> there shouldn't be significant TTL issues.
>
> Agreed, the SOA record TTL should not represent a significant  
> concern.  However, a fairly significant percentage of DNS resolvers  
> do not fully adhere to RFC 2308 and as such, reliance upon negative  
> caching should be minimized.  In other words, negative caching  
> should not be expected to terminate walks up the domain tree when  
> searching for seldom published records.

To expand upon this concept a bit.  A requirement to publish MX  
records in conjunction with DKIM/SMTP policy records benefits:

1- Slightly increased percentage of MX records positively answering  
existence probes.

2- Within existing domains, a DKIM/SMTP Policy Record absent MX  
records signifies disavowal of DKIM/SMTP.

3- DKIM/SMTP policy records signifying disavowal of DKIM/SMTP can be  
empty and not require content interpretation.

4- Asserting policy does not depend upon walking up the domain, but  
instead requires publishing empty policy records at existing nodes.

5- This Discovery/Policy assertion strategy safely extends to other  
protocols.

6- Does not depend upon wildcards.

7- Expects domains establishing policy to use a strategy that protects  
parent domains.

8- Does not modify what is permitted by the parent domain.


Item 1 moves SMTP closer to a general mandate of requiring MX records  
for message acceptance.  At that time, a need to publish an empty  
policy record at every existing domain node would be precluded.

Item 2 affords actionable responses to abuse or forgery, as this  
offers stronger evidence than invalid or missing signatures provide.

Item 3 can terminate even one level domain searches for policy, which  
would be highly recommended of any domain utilizing DKIM when such  
searching is adopted.

Item 4 minimizes memory required, and eliminates impact of changes to  
the policy record structure used in conjunction with MX records.

-Doug







  
      
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