MH Michael Hammer (5304) wrote: >> Bad actors pick whatever PRA, 2822-From, HELO, or MAIL FROM >> suits them. It's the job of v=spf1, spf2.0/pra, or ADSP to >> defeat that. > And spf2.0/pra fails to do that. The requirement to set PRA > to the sender field if a proper one exists bypasses the SPF > record intentions of the domain represented in the RFC2822 > From field email address.
They picked "Sender ID" as name for their idea, originally it was "Caller ID", but never "Author Domain ID". In a certain sense RFC 4407 is compatible with 2822(upd) Resent-*, and it protects a Purportable Responsilbe Address, not the author(s). > It is rather trivial to game PRA to get a neutral for any > particular piece of "bad" email. Yes, and it won't surprise you that I don't like spf2.0/pra, putting it very mildly. But two proposals to remove Resent-* from the picture got no traction in the 2822upd discussions. > But what does this have to do with DKIM and ADSP other > than the suggestion at an earlier point in the process to > use the sender field? Better ask Doug. I can see Resent-* as obstacle, PRA took it as given, ADSP ignores it, RFC 5016 section 4.3 mentions it. Frank _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
