Folks,
In: <http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2009q2/011959.html> Steve Atkins posted a list of suggested DKIM features to drop. This note is intended to anchor a discussion thread for discusses one of those features, namely: > Drop support for SHA1 entirely. It's beginning to look > cryptographically very dubious, and is being dropped by pretty much > everyone else. Even if the attacks against it don't affect the way > it's used in DKIM it seems unwise to suggest it be used at all. At the > very least it seems a poor "marketing" move to include an algorithm > that's been dropped by most everyone else as insecure before this spec > is finalized. > > "Verifiers MUST support rsa-sha256 and MAY support rsa-sha1. > Signers SHOULD sign using rsa-sha256 and SHOULD NOT sign using rsa- > sha1." might provide enough wiggle room to allow existing code time to > migrate away from SHA1. Please discuss arguments for and against dropping this. d/ -- Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
