There are much easier ways to do a dos attack.
/d -- Dave Crocker bbiw.net > ------- Original Message ------- > From: Eliot Lear <[email protected]> > To: Murray Kucherawy <[email protected]> > Sent: 02-Jun-09, 10:59:30 AM > Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] RFC4871bis - whether to drop -- k: Key type > > On 6/2/09 7:41 PM, Murray Kucherawy wrote: > > So if a=rsa-sha256, then the key I get from issuing a query based on s= and d= will be an RSA key, or it will fail to verify. What k= offers is somewhat redundant except for the fact that I can avoid the crypto overhead if I can detect early on that it won't work anyway. > > > > That's an important point, in the case of a DOS attack. The next > question is whether anybody implements it as such? > _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
