On 11/2/09 12:20 PM, Ian Eiloart wrote: > > > --On 30 October 2009 19:52:54 +0100 Eliot Lear <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> I can't say, but I do know that many of us toss a whole lot of mail at >> EHLO, some at MAIL FROM:<> and some at DATA. The idea I was thinking >> about was whether it provides any value whatsoever to at least know that >> you are authentically dealing with a legitimate source sooner, without >> having to send even a whole header. > > Yes it would help, but probably not more than an SPF pass would help. > What do you get from that? Well, you can check the reputation of the > MAIL FROM address.
Well now we're quibbling about how to check the MAIL FROM address. I'm still interested in an end-to-end approach. SPF doesn't give you end-to-end. A legitimate intermediate could have been compromised, for instance. MAIL FROM *does* change for mailing lists, of course, but then they should re-sign anyway. Of course, I'm still not sure this is worth the effort to fix because SPF could be Just Good Enough for the 1st pass, and then DKIM can be used on the body. Same argument seems to apply to STARTTLS, although I would imagine that the latter has more of a hit on the CPU. Eliot _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
