> Signers SHOULD NOT remove any DKIM-Signature header fields from > messages they are signing, even if they know that the signatures > cannot be verified. Instead, when a relay alters a message such > that any valid signature gets broken, it SHOULD re-identify the > message by synthesizing a new Message-ID for it, according to > Section 3.6.4 of RFC 5322. > >Would that help deterring on-the-fly auto-conversions?
No, and it would be a bad idea, anyway. I often get two copies of a message, one sent directly to me, one relayed through a mailing list that changed it enough to break the signature. By any normal standard, they're the same message, and it's useful to be able to tell that from the common Message-ID. Breaking long-established mail semantics to punish people who don't run mail the way you like is not a good idea. And in any event, if people were sufficiently aware of DKIM to do what you suggest, they're aware enough to add a new signature which is the right thing to do. R's, John _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
