Not sure I'm phrasing this correctly in this context, but I don't think that service providers are the "rational choice actors" in this scenario - any more than equipment vendors are.
It seems to me the main "actors" in applying gaming to this problem are still the end users. It is the case that their actions are limited by multiple levels of indirection, since end users affect service provider choices (via service selection), which then affects vendor choices (via equipment purchases). In the "actor" mix are equipment vendors (who must justify R&D expenses in terms of their customer willingness to spend money), service providers (who likewise need to justify the amortization of capital expenses and the expected additional operating costs in terms of their own customer's willingness to spend money) and end users (whose willingness to spend money on both services and equipment is somewhat vaguely assumed). On the flip side, the services that a service provider may offer are limited by the capabilities of the equipment that vendors provide and - obviously - the services end users may choose are limited by what's offered to them by service providers. I suspect that what makes this hard to use predictively in general is an entirely subjective "guess" that has to be made with respect the degree of flexibility the actors have in accepting choices presented to them by other actors. At what point will end-users choose no services over any of the service options presented to them? At what point will service providers, end-users, or both, choose not to buy any equipment over the equipment choices presented to them? -- Eric Gray Principal Engineer Ericsson > -----Original Message----- > From: Hallam-Baker, Phillip [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 11:58 AM > To: Tim Chown; ietf@ietf.org > Subject: RE: Game theory and IPv4 to IPv6 > > So the rational choice actors here are the ISPs not the end-users. > > Build that constraint into the model. > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Tim Chown [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 10:53 AM > > To: ietf@ietf.org > > Subject: Re: Game theory and IPv4 to IPv6 > > > > On Thu, Mar 15, 2007 at 07:37:26AM -0700, Hallam-Baker, > Phillip wrote: > > > The problem is that until IPv6 has critical mass it is much > > better to be on IPv4 than IPv6. > > > > > > If there are any grad students reading the list take a look > > at the game theory literature and apply it to the transition. > > Assume that it's a rat-choice world and that each actor > > follows their best interest. > > > > > > An actor can be in one of several states: > > > > > > Unconnected > > > IPv4 connected with own address > > > IPv4-NAT connected with NAT address > > > IPv4/IPv6 connected Dual stack > > > IPv4-NAT/IPv6 connected Dual stack > > > IPv6 connected > > > > Unfortunately most of the rats cannot choose certain states, > > so the game > > is fundamentally flawed. The ISPs are keeping the cheese to > > themselves. > > > > Squeak. > > > > -- > > Tim > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Ietf mailing list > > Ietf@ietf.org > > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf > > > > _______________________________________________ > Ietf mailing list > Ietf@ietf.org > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf > _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
